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Regulatory Cooperation in International
Trade and Its Transformative Effects on
Executive Power*
ELIZABETH TRUJILLO**
ABSTRACT
As international trade receives the brunt of local discontent with
globalization trends and recent changes by the Trump administration
have put into question the viability of such trade arrangements moving
forward, there has been a clear trend in using international trade fora
for managing regulatory barriers on economic development. This paper
will discuss this recent trend in international trade toward increased
regulatory cooperation through the creation of formalized transnational
regulatory bodies, such as the U.S.-EU Regulatory Cooperation Body
that was being discussed in the TTIP negotiations and comparable ones
in the Canadian-EU Trade Agreement as well as U.S.-Mexico and U.S.Canada Regulatory Councils. In examining the informal transnational

* This article derived in part from the 2016 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL
STUDIES SYMPOSIUM on “The Transnational Executive,” which was held at the Indiana
University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington. Thus, this article can also be considered
as part of the collection published in Volume 24 of the Indiana Journal Global Legal
Studies that focused on the transnational.
** Elizabeth Trujillo, etrujillo@law.tamu.edu, is a Professor of Law at Texas A&M
University School of Law (as of Fall 2016) and an Alexander von Humboldt Research
Fellow. This paper and/or excerpts of this paper have been presented at the following
workshops and conferences: the 2015 ASIL-ESIL-MPI RESEARCH WORKSHOP, “The Future
of Transatlantic Economic Governance in the Age of the BRICS,” held at the Max Planck
Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg, Germany; the
2016 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES SYMPOSIUM on “The Transnational
Executive,” at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington; the Center for
Political Science and Constitutional Law Studies (Centro de Estudios Politicos y
Constitucionales) in May 2017 in Madrid, Spain; and the Trade Law in the Trump Era: A
Transatlantic Perspective CONFERENCE held at Boston University School of Law in
September 2017. The author thanks the participants, especially Professor Fred Aman and
Professor Andrés Boix Palop of Administrative Law at the University of Valencia, at these
venues for their comments and suggestions on prior drafts. Special thanks to Anna Roy
from Suffolk University Law School for her excellent research assistance on this project.
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regulatory networks that have emerged from trade integration, it
becomes clear that fragmentation has created non-centralized avenues
for dialogue among various stakeholders to influence domestic
regulation, especially in areas of environmental regulation, energy, and
sustainable development. The paper argues that this trend has led
toward the institutionalization of regulatory cooperation through
preferential trade agreements, rather than multilaterally. Transnational
regulatory networks and more formalized means of regulatory
cooperation have influenced the executive branch, traditionally charged
with negotiating trade agreements, from lead negotiator to a “regulatory
partner” working not only for reducing barriers to trade, but also more
specifically for the streamlining of regulatory standards that impact
costs of inputs along the supply chain. Given today’s negative climate
around globalization and recent U.S. initiatives to diminish the role of
agencies all together to implement regulation, this trend could take yet
another turn—one that centralizes decisions regarding regulation in the
President and his cabinet.
INTRODUCTION
As Brexit negotiations are under way in Brussels and NAFTA
renegotiations continue on the other side of the Atlantic, one can only
ponder at so much popular discontent over trade, twenty-three years
after the “golden decade” for globalization. The 1990s was an important
decade for globalization advocates: the European Union (EU) solidified
its political and legal shape in November 1993 and the World Trade
Organization came into existence with its robust dispute settlement
body in January 1995. In 1994, the Free Trade Agreement for South
American countries known as the MERCOSUR was finalized, and the
North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was executed. What has
been referred to as “the constitutional moment” for globalization was
born;1 international and regional institutions would be the guiding light
for economic globalization through the rule of law and international
courts. Despite the benefits that Europe, Britain, and the United States

1. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND
JURISPRUDENCE (1998); JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990);
Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005);
Robert Howse, Moving the WTO Forward–One Case at a Time, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 223
(2009); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and the Millennium Round, in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 111133 (Marco Bronckers &
Reinhard Quick eds., 2000). But see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s
‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 647 (2006)
(challenging the view that the WTO is a constitutional entity).
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have enjoyed from international trade, being the major architects of the
trading system and international institutions that we have today, these
regions have exhibited a shift away from globalization toward
isolationism, from liberalizing trade and integrating economies, toward
protectionism. However, this trend has not diminished the role of
transnationalism, particularly as it pertains to regulatory coordination
among countries, especially at the regional level. This is primarily
evident when taking a close look at recent negotiations for preferential
trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPP),2 the Canadian-EU Trade Agreement (CETA), and the the TransAtlantic Trade and Partnership Agreement (TTIP). These agreements
primarily address non-tariff barriers, as opposed to tariff barriers, and
create mechanisms for institutionalizing regulatory coordination
through the creation of transnational regulatory coordination
committees and/or boards. In this way, they bring regulators and trade
policy makers together and in turn, expand the influence of the U.S.
executive branch in the development of regulations that are also tradefriendly.
This paper will examine the ways in which international trade
agreements have influenced the role of the “transnational executive,” 3
bringing together agency expertise, through the negotiating power of
the executive, with commerce and trade. In the United States, this
trend, in combination with trade promotion or “fast-track” authority,
which has limited the congressional ability to dispute already
negotiated trade provisions once the agreement is ready for
congressional vote, has expanded executive power to participate in
regulatory processes in new ways, especially for the environment and
energy. The paper will discuss the current trend in international trade
toward increased regulatory cooperation through the creation of
formalized transnational regulatory bodies, such as the U.S.-EU
Regulatory Cooperation Body discussed in TTIP negotiations. It will
examine the more informal transnational regulatory networks emerging
from trade integration, as ways in which non-centralized avenues for
dialogue among various stakeholders may influence domestic
regulation, especially in areas of environmental regulation, energy, and
2. President Trump signed an executive order withdrawing the United States from
the signed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Withdrawal of the United States from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017).
However, the remaining parties continue ahead with a possible signing of the TPP,
without the United States, in March 2018. See Shawn Donnan, et al., Trans-Pacific Trade
Deal to Go Ahead Without US, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.ft.com/
content/7a10d70a-0031-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5.
3. For discussions on the evolving legal system of transnationalism, see the collection
of articles found in Issue 2 of Volume 24 of the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies.
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sustainable development. In doing so, these regulatory networks change
the role of the executive branch, traditionally charged with negotiating
trade agreements, from lead negotiator to a “regulatory partner”
working not only for reducing barriers to trade, but also more
specifically for the streamlining of regulatory standards that impact
costs of inputs along the supply chain.
The paper will proceed as follows. The first part will discuss recent
changes in the approach of the executive branch when it comes to
regulation, focusing on the traditional principles in administrative law
that facilitate the use of trade agreements as platforms for domestic
regulatory reform by the executive branch. Furthermore, it will
demonstrate a trend in transnational cooperation among agencies
across borders. It will also discuss some of the nuanced relationships
among the legislative, judicial, and executive branches as the role of
presidential authority shifts, especially when coupled with its power to
negotiate international trade agreements which address domestic
regulation.
The second section will discuss the ways regulation has changed
from command and control mechanisms toward more market-driven
voluntary forms of regulations. In this trend, regulatory networks have
emerged, setting standards for countries and across borders. These
transnational regulatory networks, consisting of state and non-state
actors including the private sector have also influenced international
standard-setting organizations as well as international trade. This
bottom-up strategy for regulation has implications for governance;4 and
in particular, for the kinds of technical expertise reaching agencies. As
regulators increasingly participate in the execution of trade agreements,
they can also influence economic strategies.
The third part will examine recent trade agreements and their focus
on the reduction of non-tariff barriers, rather than tariffs, and the
development of transnational regulatory councils to enhance regulatory
harmonization and convergence across borders. It will compare these
trends in the NAFTA, CETA, TTIP, and TPP, and specifically consider
the ramifications for environmental sustainable development and
natural resources. Even though the TPP and TTIP agreements have
been put on hold for now,5 these plurilateral agreements marked an
important trend in negotiating trade agreements, with a domestic
emphasis on using preferential trade agreements to further economic

4. Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy
and the Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environmental Matters, 25
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001).
5. See references cited supra note 2.
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and regulatory goals rather than the multilateral framework, and they
will likely remain as models for future trade agreements.
Finally, the paper will discuss some of the challenges ahead with
using international trade agreements as platforms for changing
domestic regulatory policy. It will examine some ways in which this
trend in preferential trade agreements not only impacts domestic
policies but also those of the developing world. It will discuss the
geopolitical contexts in which the transnational executive authority is
negotiating such trade agreements, wherein different economic powers
are impacting their outcome. Finally, the paper will conclude with
reflections on the transformative effects on executive power in the
context of trade and regulatory cohesion.
I. REGULATORY COORDINATION AND EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY IN THE
UNITED STATES
President Obama’s 2012 executive order, No. 13609, which was built
on an earlier executive order calling for the improvement of regulation
and regulatory review, directs executive branch agencies and
encourages independent regulatory agencies to identify regulations with
international impact and also to strive to eliminate unnecessary
regulatory divergences.6 It also explicitly recognizes the relevance in
international trade in impacting and shaping domestic regulation.
The order defines “International regulatory cooperation” as a
bilateral, regional, or multilateral process, other than processes that are
covered by section 6(a)(ii), (iii), and (v) of this order, in which national
governments engage in various forms of collaboration and
communication with respect to regulations. 7
This push for transnational regulatory cooperation and recognition
of the role of international trade in shaping domestic regulation
formally bridges the State Department and other administrative
agencies in various ways, concentrating the responsibility of developing
policies for the social policy space in the executive branch and less in the
legislative. In part, it was a response to the need for interagency
coordination, where many areas of regulation and administration are
fragmented and have overlapping administrative scope. 8 One of the
primary purposes of congressional delegation of authority to
administrative agencies is to facilitate centers of expertise and
6. See Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413 (May 1, 2012).
7. Id. at 26,414.
8. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1133–34 (2012) (stating that “interagency coordination is one of the
great challenges of modern governance”).

370

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 25:1

specialization in key areas concerning the public interest, like
environmental protection. However, with the increased number of
agencies and specialized areas of expertise, there can be redundancy
and inefficiency in the creation and execution of regulations. 9 Some
scholars have suggested various ways in which there can be more
streamlining of agency work, including various types of coordination
tools such as interagency consultation, interagency agreements, and
joint policymaking.10 Another tool may include more centralized
mechanisms through the President’s ability to deploy different councils
and task forces, bringing together various areas of expertise to consult
on specific topics.11 Using international trade agreements as a platform
for aggregating agency expertise on issues from food safety and
licensing measures, to management of fisheries and cross-border trade
provides yet another avenue not only for agency coordination, but also
for the President to use his authority as key trade negotiator to
centralize these coordination efforts further and set the agenda for both
international trade and regulation. Interestingly, one of the first
regulatory agencies was the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),
which, at the time, handled the regulatory aspects of the railroad
industry in the late 1800s and was key to the economic development of
the United States. In the years that followed, the U.S. Congress
expanded its regulatory scope into areas of food and drugs, unfair
competition, shipping, and radio. The next section will provide some
background on the ways in which regulatory authority in the United
States passed from the legislative branch to the executive one.
A. Regulatory Authority in the United States
1. Delegation and Chevron Doctrines
Professor Jaffe noted that delegation of legislative power to agencies
is “the dynamo of modern social services state.” 12 Debates in the United
States around the delegation doctrine turn on the balance between
whether such power should remain within congress or delegated to
agencies and between decentralization by transferring such power to

9. Id. at 1135 (discussing areas where such redundancy and inefficiencies may
manifest).
10. See id. at 1136.
11. Id.
12. Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on the Delegation of Legislative Power: II, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 561, 592 (1947).
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bureaucratic yet specialized work of agency expertise.13 Furthermore,
the extent of federal agency power over state regulatory authority is not
always clear under the Administrative Procedure Act, 14 despite the role
of U.S. courts to strike the right balance.15 Traditionally, the hope has
been that the technical expertise of agencies would be better situated to
implement congressional legislation, especially at the time of the New
Deal when there was an increase of specialized agencies and rise in
social programs. However, the extent to which agencies should have
such authority has been the topic of much scholarly debate, especially
concerning issues of accountability and the rights of individuals. 16
Despite legislative powers in the United States being vested in
Congress, throughout U.S. jurisprudential history, there has been an
understanding that the resources of Congress may be best used by
delegating some of its powers to more specialized agencies that can
implement congressional statutes at lower decision costs. 17
Furthermore, under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I of the
U.S. Constitution, Congress may establish, through statute, the
establishment of a program along with implementation guidelines but
delegate the actual implementation to the experts and technicians

13. U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 1 provides the initial authority for Congress to
legislate: “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress . . . .” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1. This Article has been the basis for the non-delegation doctrine in which
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1892 reiterated the general principle that Congress cannot
delegate its legislative power. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
14. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2012).
15. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023,
2028 (2008) (examining “how the Court may be employing administrative law as a vehicle
for addressing federalism concerns” and “assess[ing] how well administrative law
performs this role and how the Court should understand the relationship between
federalism and administrative law”). This article identifies the federalism-reinforcing
features of Administrative law, but concludes that the Court’s decisions have not gone far
enough in this respect.
16. See generally, e.g., JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 132–33 (1980) (arguing
that the Supreme Court, in reviewing administrative decisions, should devote itself to
assuring majority governance while protecting minority rights); JAMES O. FREEDMAN,
CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 15–20 (1978) (examining the causes of the enduring sense of crisis
associated with the administrative process and arguing a theory of legitimacy for the
administrative process must be created); LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 63 (1965) (proffering that courts and administrative agencies
“are in a partnership of lawmaking and law-applying” that operates in a matrix of
congressionally delegated authority).
17. See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)
(recognizing, for the first time, that Congress could delegate policymaking authority under
“an intelligible principle” within the statute that would guide agency discretion); see
generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9–36 (2001)
(discussing the evolution of the delegation doctrine).
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inside an agency.18 The Supreme Court has struggled with the
pragmatism of the delegation doctrine with the need to protect the
democratic principle of ensuring that decisions concerning social policy
remain within the legislative branch rather than in the hands of
technocrats that may not come under the same scrutiny ensured by the
democratic process.19
Overall, the traditional literature for Congress’s delegation power is
that delegation takes away its own policy-making authority,
transferring it to the executive branch, as the heads of agencies are
Presidential appointments and members of his cabinet.20 This
transference, however, is a zero-sum game because Congress will
always fight for its legislative authority when necessary and structural
competition among the branches will prevent from overreach of any one
branch.21
In addition to the delegation doctrine, Courts have used the Chevron
doctrine to provide deference to agency decisions when there are gaps or
ambiguities in the congressional statute regarding issues within the
agency’s purview. The Court noted in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,
Inc., that “the court may not substitute its own construction for a
reasonable interpretation”22 by an agency. A detailed analysis of judicial
nuances of the Chevron doctrine is beyond the scope of this paper.
Suffice it to say that it allows the Court to provide a reasonable review
of the agency’s analysis of the text of a statute in conjunction with a
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. For judicial elaboration on the contours of the
justifications of such delegation, see, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding that the Live Poultry Code, approved by an executive order,
was invalid because Congress had improperly delegated legislative power to the Executive
Branch); J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 396 (finding that Congress could not
delegate its purely legislative power to a commission, but, having laid down the general
rules under which a commission should proceed, it could require the application of such
rules to particular situations).
19. A “public interest” perspective on administrative agencies focuses on the role of
agencies as being for the promotion of a social policy or “public value.” A “public choice”
view would emphasize that administrative agencies are the result of competing interest
groups and self-serving legislators. See Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and
Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government
Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148–49 (1977) (distinguishing between the two models).
20. See Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the
Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1469–76 (2015) (discussing the conventional
separation of power issues with the delegation doctrine).
21. See id. at 1468; see also Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 61, 147 (2006); see also Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation
of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2359 (2006); Thomas W. Merrill,
Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 2097, 2148 (2004).
22. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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court’s inquiry into the legislative purposes behind the measure in
question.23 It also stands for the general principle that if the agency’s
review is reasonable, the Court will defer to the agency interpretation of
the law in question, which may include not only a statutory provision
but also the scope of agency expertise as well as relevant procedural
formats.24 Justice Scalia embraced the idea that judicial deference to
agency interpretations forced the legislative branch to “bear the ‘costs’
of delegations by assigning policy-making choices to the executive[,]”25
which in turn caused Congress to “choose when and how it delegates
authority.”26 Furthermore, such judicial deference allows courts to
deflect judicial lawmaking to the executive branch, thereby allowing the
political process to “correct” any “excessive [congressional]
delegations.”27
While much of the traditional literature on agency power focuses on
specific areas of public policy with which each agency specializes, calls
for efficiency and more transparency among different regulatory spheres
have allowed for enhanced inter-agency coordination. This “shared
regulatory space” would allow regulators from different specialized
agencies to better coordinate policies with overlapping goals. 28
Fragmentation of agencies can result in regulatory bargaining over
which agency is best situated to oversee certain regulations; this in turn
can have perverse effects on the stringency of certain regulations such
as environmental protection. Legislators, regulators, and the President
may have varying views in this regulatory bargaining process.
Lawmakers may address these areas of conflict in different ways,
including creating new agencies or delegating policy discretion to more
than one agency, creating fragmentation. 29 At times, fragmentation may
allow for more independence and specialization of agency work. On the
23. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 17, at 492.
24. See id.; see also Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based
Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989 (1999). Relevant case law regarding judicial
interpretations of reasonableness include: AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366
(1999); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. DOT, 843 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Int’l Union,
UMW v. FMSHRC, 840 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1988); NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
25. Rao, supra note 20, at 1474.
26. Decker v. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 619 (2013).
27. Rao, supra note 20, at 1475.
28. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1136. But see Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency
Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421 (2015) (proposing that agency heads possess
substantial discretion in reorganizing the internal structures and processes of an agency
and that as a result of this authority and external political factors, the unit of analysis
should be primarily on intra-agency coordination, rather than on inter-agency
coordination).
29. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1141.
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other hand though, resulting redundancies and inefficiencies can
undermine the regulatory goals themselves. 30
Cross-border regulatory cooperation, through transnational
networks, has allowed for increased dialogue among regulators across
borders.31 This paper will further discuss the ways in which recent
trends in international trade agreements to establish mechanisms for
cross-border regulatory coherence have further expanded this “shared
regulatory space,” allowing the executive branch to merge domestic
regulatory goals with that of trade liberalization policy. In doing so,
domestic agency coordination may be enhanced, but also regulatory
bargaining becomes more centralized in the executive power through
the President’s constitutional authority to negotiate trade agreements.32
The expansion of congressional delegation authority, along with its
close brother the Chevron doctrine, combined with the trade promotion
authority (fast-track authority), which takes away some congressional
power over approval of trade agreements, raises important questions
about the transformative power of international trade on the power of
the executive branch in the United States.33
2. Trade Promotion Authority
Foreign affairs, which include the negotiation of international
treaties, does not belong exclusively to Congress. Broad delegations of
congressional power to the executive branch are traditionally tolerated
as decided in the Supreme Court case, United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., which involved Presidential authority with respect to
international sale of arms involving U.S. companies. 34 International
trade is both within the scope of congressional authority, under the
Commerce Clause of the Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, as
well as within that of the executive branch under Article II. The
30. See id. at 1141–45.
31. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (describing
government officials’ networks to exchange information and coordinate activity across
national borders to tackle crime, terrorism, and daily international interactions).
32. Article II §2 provides the President with authority to enter into treaties with twothirds of Senate approval. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 which
provides Congress with the authority to regulate commerce.
33. Bipartisan Comprehensive Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 114-26, 129 Stat. 320 (2015); Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No.
114-27, 129 Stat. 362 (2015); see also Ian F. Fergusson, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)
and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy, CONG. RES. SERV. 28 (June 15, 2015)
(summarizing history of Trade Promotion Authority and legislative renewals of Trade
Agreements Authority).
34. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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President has the power to make Treaties but only with the “consent
and advice” of two-thirds of the Senate.35
The congressional Trade Promotion Authority, or “fast-track
authority,” first put into place in the 1970s, allows for increased interbranch harmony and efficiency.36 In short, from 1974 to 1993, Congress
allowed that, in turn for being updated during the negotiation process of
a trade treaty, there would only be an up or down vote (without
amendments) and a simple majority in voting for the final negotiated
agreement.37 It is an authority granted for a temporary period of time
before it must be renewed by Congress, which occurred prior to the
approval of the NAFTA in 1994. In 2002, President Bush signed the
Trade Act which included a renewal of fast-track authority and which
provided for some changes in procedures to allow for more input from
Congress during the negotiating process.38 Under this Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Authority, several U.S. trade agreements were signed
including Colombia, Panama, and South Korea.39
The fast-track authority has been criticized by many as being
undemocratic, a means of circumventing the democratic process of
legislative debate on issues of international trade which are, in
principle, within the power of the legislative branch under the
Commerce Clause.40 However, these debates have been somewhat
quieted with the understanding that for a temporary period of time,

35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
36. Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to
Beyond, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 687, 695 (1996).
37. CHARAN DEVEREAUX, ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL D. WATKINS, 1 CASE
STUDIES IN U.S. TRADE NEGOTIATION, at 187–94 (2006).
38. Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3803–3805 (2004).
39. See REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EXTENSION OF TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY:
CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 2103(C)(2) OF THE TRADE ACT OF 2002 (2005).
40. See, e.g., Leslie Alan Glick, World Trade After September 11, 2001: The U.S.
Response, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 627, 63738 (2002) (discussing Congress’s debate over
legislative authority and the constitutionality of TPA); Natalie R. Minter, Fast Track
Procedures: Do They Infringe upon Congressional Constitutional Rights?, 1 SYRACUSE J.
LEGIS. & POL’Y 107 (1995). But see Samuel C. Straight, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying
Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216, 236
(1995) (discussing the ways that fast track provides necessary flexibility to the Executive
Branch in negotiating trade agreements) and Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and
United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 143, 14348 (1992) (arguing that fast
track is not undemocractic). In the context of NAFTA and fast-track authority, see the
debate regarding “congressional-executive agreements” in Bruce Ackerman & David
Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional? 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995); Laurence H. Tribe,
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1995); and David M. Golove, Against FreeForm Formalism, N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998).
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such authority is constitutional.41 Furthermore, the renewal within the
2002 Trade Act allowed for increased participation and comment during
the treaty negotiation process, tempering concerns of a steep democratic
deficit at play. Though the 2002 Trade Act expired in 2007, it remained
in effect for agreements already being negotiated until their execution.42
In preparation for the conclusion of the TPP and TTIP agreements,
Congress in 2015 approved the Trade Preferences Extension Act, signed
into law by President Obama.43
When fast-track authority is understood together with congressional
delegation power and the Chevron doctrine, it raises interesting
questions regarding (1) the role of administrative agencies in shaping
executive authority when it comes to policies that will impact domestic
regulatory practices vis-à-vis trade liberalization policies; and (2) the
ways in which recent preferential trade agreements containing more
formal structures for enhanced cross-border regulatory convergence,
have the effect of concentrating regulatory priorities in the executive
branch, away from the legislative branch. As a result, the expert
knowledge of administrative agencies transforms to include trade
liberalization goals and vice versa. This is especially true in the recent
models for trade agreements where the focus of negotiations has been
less on tariff reduction and more on non-tariff management, which in
turn, requires increased regulatory convergence across borders. This
will be further explored in the following sections which will focus on the
relevance of two trends in this context: (1) the ways in which
international trade impacts domestic regulation; and (2) the ways in
which regulation has transitioned toward more market-driven
mechanisms rather than traditional command and control forms of
regulation.
B. Regulatory Convergence through International Trade
International trade rules encourage trade liberalization and
discipline governments from passing protectionist measures. Article III
of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) provides that
fiscal and non-fiscal measures must not discriminate against imports as
compared to “like domestic products.”44 While tariffs have significantly
41. See Margaret M. Kim, Trade Promotion Authority: Evaluating the Necessity of
Congressional Oversight and Accountability, 40 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 317, 325–26 (2016)
(discussing constitutional basis of TPA).
42. Among the trade agreements approved during this time are: U.S.-Panama, U.S.Colombia, and U.S.-Peru.
43. Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, 129 Stat. 362 (2015).
44. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5.
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been reduced worldwide, non-tariff barriers (NTBs), those non-fiscal
measures (such as regulatory measures) that may impact trade, still
challenge international trade regimes. For this reason, much of the
focus of the TPP and the TTIP negotiations were on finding ways to
reduce non-tariff barriers, both through direct commitments in certain
sectors like licensing requirements for intellectual property rights,45 but
also by establishing specialized committees and transnational
regulatory coordination bodies that would encourage and allow
regulators of Parties to convene, review, and monitor the establishment
and implementation of regulation.46
Through the trade governance mechanisms found in the WTO and
preferential trade agreements, the relationship between trade norms
and regulatory ones has evolved, and in some instances, become more
intertwined. This is particularly evident in the area of trade and
environment, the relationship which will be the focus in this paper as it
relates to regulatory convergence. There are key moments where the
contestation of trade goals with those of environmental sustainability
have allowed for the emergence of a dialogical focus on the contours of
the relationship, allowing for possible shifts in the normative objectives
of either domain while considering the multilateral, regional, and
domestic aspects.47
A dialogic approach has traditionally been associated with the role
of courts and the ways in which they “communicate” with other
branches of government. In international law, scholars such as Ruti
Teitel and Anne-Marie Slaughter have examined the various ways that
judicial comity manifests itself transnationally—fostering international
reciprocity of international norms and enhancing the ability of these
norms to travel across jurisdictional lines, even taking hold
domestically. 48 In the trade context, different legal norms may interact
transnationally. These interactions allow for cross-fertilization of trade

45. See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, arts. 18.1-.83, Feb. 4, 2016 [hereinafter
TPP], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/t
pp-full-text.
46. See generally infra Part IV, section A.
47. See generally Elizabeth Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach to Trade and Environment,
16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 535 (2013) (using a dialogical approach to examine the vertical,
horizontal, and diagonal dimensions of the trade and environmental relationship resulting
in increased convergence between the norms of these two
camps).
48. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 99, 117–19 (1994) (proposing that transnational judicial communication
allows for norms to travel across legal systems and therefore, enhance cross fertilization
for dissimilar areas of the law); see also Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a
Global Age, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2570, 258487 (2004).
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and non-trade issues.49 In focusing on the “dialogue” between trade and
environmental norms through the vertical relationship between WTO
dispute settlement bodies and regulatory processes of Member States,
there is a dynamic process of the judiciary “engaging” with elements of
domestic agency decisions.50 Trade dispute settlement bodies decide the
viability of non-tariff trade barriers under trade jurisprudence for
example.51 This process has in fact forced trade adjudicators into legal
areas outside the trade scope, including environmental law and
domestic regulation. An example of this is one of the first trade and
environment cases, US Tuna I, in which the GATT dispute settlement
body had to decide whether a U.S. moratorium on imports of Mexican
yellowfin tuna under the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act violated
trade commitments.52
Furthermore, the committee work of the WTO specialized bodies has
an administrative character, especially as it supports the Secretariat on
specific challenges for trade, such as the tense relationship between
trade and environment.53 The horizontal relationship between the
adjudicatory and administrative functions of the WTO creates another
form of dialogue that may lead to cross-fertilization of trade and
environmental norms. The discursive and dynamic aspects of
adjudication can find their way into the administrative function of the
WTO.54 The workings of the Secretariat and its working groups and
committees allows the administrative parts of the WTO to become a
political forum through which Member States may dialogue and reach

49. See generally Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach, supra note 47 (discussing ways that
trade and environmental norms travel transnationally and converge).
50. See Jay Tidmarsh, A Dialogic Defense of Alden, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1161
(2000) (discussing the dialogic aspects of the judiciary interacting with non-judiciary
elements); see also ELIZABETH TRUJILLO, REFRAMING THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT
LINKAGE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD (forthcoming 2018)
(reframing the trade and environment relationship through a sustainable development
lens and using a dialogical approach to identify three ways in which trade and
environmental norms have converged during the various phases of the trade and
environment relationship: vertically, horizontally, and diagonally).
51. See infra Part II.
52. Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS21/R
(Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter US-Tuna I] (concerning quantitative restrictions prohibitions
under GATT Article IX; however, the DSB stated that if GATT Article III applied to this
case, there could in fact be a violation of national treatment commitments).
53. See Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach, supra note 47, at 539 (proposing that
adjudication is only one aspect of cross-fertilization of trade and environmental issues and
“[t]he discursive and dynamic aspects of adjudication can find their way into the
administrative function of the WTO,” also contributing toward cross-fertilization of
environmental and trade norms).
54. See id.
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agreement (or not) on matters concerning trade and the environment. 55
Furthermore, committee decisions (and ministerial decisions) may in
fact influence treaty interpretations of dispute settlement bodies,
further impacting the ways in which trade and environmental issues
may converge.56 Another way in which trade and environmental norms
converge vertically, and horizontally in some instances, is in the
interaction between the multilateral framework of the WTO and the
regional frameworks of preferential trade agreements, such as the
MERCOSUR. Brazil-Recycled Tyres,57 concerning Brazil’s moratorium
on the importation of recycled tires for non-MERCOSUR members,
provides an example of this dynamic. 58 However, a detailed discussion
on these vertical and horizontal dimensions is beyond the scope of the
paper, as the primary focus will be on a third dimension for trade and
environmental normative convergence.59
A diagonal approach allows us to appreciate the impact that
fragmentation has on the convergence of trade and environmental
norms. From this perspective, there is no hierarchy per se in which to
invoke various legal norms 60—a trade dispute settlement body may
consider legal norms in or outside of trade or in other international
treaties and international environmental communities may be borrowed
from trade norms.61 In this context, there may be parallel regimes
having jurisdiction on similar issues—regional/multilateral, such as in
55. See Shaffer, supra note 4 (applying three alternative frames of the WTO’s handling
of trade and environmental issues, the author discusses the “intergovernmental
perspective” as one that allows states to bargain in the WTO Committee on Trade and
Environment and respond to various stakeholder interests).
56. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R (adopted Sept.
15, 2011) [hereinafter US-Tuna II] (using a TBT Committee decision, the WTO Appellate
Body determined the meaning of “international standards” in the TBT Agreement). See
generally, Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach, supra note 47, at 560562.
57. Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007).
58. For more discussion on this dynamic, see generally Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach,
supra note 47, at 562573.
59. For a discussion on the vertical and horizontal dimensions of normative
convergence of trade and environmental issues, see generally TRUJILLO, supra note 50;
Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach, supra note 47.
60. Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶ 85, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682
(2006) (stating that the main sources of international law are not in a hierarchical
relationship inter se).
61. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2049–50 (explaining that one characteristic of a
dialogical approach is that it has “bidirectionality”; and therefore, any court may initiate
dialogue and engage with the jurisprudence of another).
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the case of Chile-Swordfish, which was brought as both a WTO case and
a UNCLOS case.62 Because of the lack of hierarchy, the fragmentation
in trade adjudication becomes particularly relevant in understanding
the ways in which environmental issues and trade cross-fertilize,
especially with respect to vertical and horizontal forms of judicial
engagement.63
In addition and particularly relevant to this paper, this view also
highlights the less formal means of convergence; namely, through the
emergence of transnational regulatory norms which include voluntary,
market-driven forms of regulation instead of the traditional command
and control regulatory measures imposed and monitored by
governments. These can include, for example, labeling schemes which
are usually established by non-state actors like NGOs and sometimes
monitored in conjuction with government.64 The following section will
focus on this form of convergence, in which regulatory networks create
informal collaborations that help to establish new regulatory norms
from the bottom up, and which eventually find their way into the
regulatory processes of governments. Trade agreements are becoming
one way to adopt these forms of regulatory norms.
II. REGULATORY NETWORKS AS PART OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
A. “Informal Collaboration”: Transnational Regulatory Norms
The development of transnational regulatory coordination bodies
such as the U.S.-Mexico Regulatory Cooperation Council; the U.S.Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council; and the one being discussed in
the TTIP, the U.S.-EU Regulatory Cooperation Body, seems like a
natural progression in the life of transnational regulatory norms. Much

62. Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Chile—Measures
Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish, WTO Doc. WT/DS193/1 (Apr.
19, 2000); Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish
Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile/European Union), Case No. 7, Order of
Dec. 16, 2003, ITLOS Rep. 65, 6971, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cas
es/case_no_7/7_order_161203_en.pdf.
63. See Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach, supra note 47, at 568577 (discussing the role
of fragmentation in understanding the less formal means of convergence). See generally
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICHMOND L.
REV. 99 (exploring the commonalities in the various horizontal and vertical forms of
communication among courts transnationally).
64. See Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach, supra note 47, at 579 (stating, “[i]n this new
form of regulation, [non-state actors like] NGOs and private actors are working with
intergovernmental organizations and governments to help create and monitor such
standards”).
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has been written regarding the ways in which globalization has allowed
regulators from different countries to increasingly work together to
develop understanding of regulation across boundaries and in turn,
influence the creation of new regulations, from the “bottom up.”65
Transnational regulatory norms are those that derive from public
and private networks working together to create standards and
regulations that may or may not be necessarily mandatory, but that do
get adopted either through industry practice, industry consensus, and/or
the forces of the free market. They are transnational because they move
across borders and sometimes across international regimes. 66 More
understanding on these various movements of norms is needed;
however, the actual movement from domestic across borders is
transnational in nature and in scope.67
On the regulatory front, increasing transnational structures and
partnerships allow for the establishment of new standards and
regulatory change. Many of the transnational regulatory norms arising
from these partnerships are different from traditional forms of state
regulation because (1) they do not necessarily derive from state
government processes; (2) they are not always mandatory; and (3) they
are not specifically enforced by the state but rather by private entities
responding to market pressures. NGOs have demanded stricter
regulation of international businesses and the protection of labor rights
and the environment. This has led to increased awareness of the need
for corporate social responsibility, for example, which is even reflected
in various sections of the TPP such as the investment, labor, and
environment chapters of the same agreement. 68 While it is true that the
corporate social responsibility provisions only require that parties
encourage the enterprises operating in their respective territories to
voluntarily implement voluntary standards of corporate social

65. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through
Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 204 (Michael
Byers ed., 2000); Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking:
The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005); Kal
Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks
and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002).
66. See Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change, 37 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 229, 246–47 (2012); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40
VA. J. INT’L L. 1103 (2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44
HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 192 (2003).
67. Shaffer, supra note 4, at 4 (distinguishing global law from transnational and
explaining that there may be global law that moves through the international regime
framework to influence or affect domestic law).
68. See TPP, supra note 45, art. 9.16; id. art. 19.7 (relating to labor); id. art. 20.10,
(relating to the environment).
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responsibility for their corporate practices, it is groundbreaking for
trade agreements to incorporate such provisions at all.
Transnational regulatory norms also evolve from private actors
working with intergovernmental organizations and NGOs to help create
such standards. Some examples of relevant intergovernmental
standards would include the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) and the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Both
were established through the WTO to help set harmonized standards for
creating environmentally safe products and food standards in the case
of Codex. In these ways, global norms trickle down toward the domestic
and the transnational.69 Private firms have also collaborated with each
of these global entities to create networks through which standards may
be implemented and monitored by third parties. Many times these
networks use standards by the intergovernmental organization. These
networks allow for interaction of global regulatory norms and
transnational ones, where the state may play a role but is not
necessarily the source of regulation. In this way, global regulatory
norms converge with transnational ones, impacting the ways in which
regulations are implemented domestically.
Transnational regulatory norms are particularly evident with
respect to labeling schemes. An eco-label, for example, is one that
identifies the product’s impact on the environment based on the life
cycle of the product. It provides information to consumers about the
relative environmental quality of a product. Several eco-labeling
schemes, both public and private and even public/private regulatory
schemes, turn to the international global standards of the ISO and
Global Ecolabelling Network for guidance. 70 The Global Ecolabelling
Network, for example, is a non-profit organization consisting of private
and public organizations that operate eco-labeling schemes and

69. Shaffer, supra note 66, at 232 (distinguishing between global laws, which are
“universal legal norms [that] are being created and diffused globally in different legal
domains[,]” and transnational law, which “comprises legal norms that apply across
borders to parties located in more than one jurisdiction”).
70. Such eco-labels that use ISO and Global Ecolabelling Network include: Good
Environmental Choice Australia; Biogarantie and Ecogarantie (Belgium); Qualidad
Ambiental (Brazil); California Certified Organic Farmers; Canada Organic; Huan (China);
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EU); Green Label (Hong Kong); Eco-Mark (Japan);
Ecoleaf (Japan); carboNZero (New Zealand); Vitality Leaf (Russia); Singapore Green
Labelling Scheme (Singapore); E-Mark (South Korea); Green Mark (Taiwan); Green Seal
(United States). Many countries, including the United States, have multiple eco-labels,
some referring to ISO but others with unknown resources or other private resources for
guidance, such as ISEAL Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental
Standards.
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programs around the world, which comport with the ISO standards. 71 It
includes outside monitoring and is voluntary.72 Other schemes,
especially in the United States, look to national standards, which are
not necessarily connected to the ISO or any other international
standardizing organization. In the EU, mandatory standards are not
uncommon, though they usually are monitored and implemented by
Member States even if the standards may be set by the EU Commission.
This changing regulatory landscape changes the state’s traditional
role in creating, monitoring, and enforcing regulation, for the private
sector and civil society has taken on a larger role in setting regulatory
standards and enforcing them.73 This dynamic, which has been termed
the “Transnational New Governance model,” accommodates for the
growing number of public-private partnerships establishing regulatory
standards moving beyond borders.74 NGOs such as Rainforest Alliance;
the Brazilian IMAFLORA; and the Brazilian coffee industry association,
ABIC, are working together to certify Brazilian coffee as “sustainable”
and using the Rainforest Alliance Certified seal.75
71. See generally GLOBAL ECOLABELLING NETWORK, https://globalecolabelling.net (last
visited Jan. 31, 2018). See also ISO CENTRAL SECRETARIAT, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELS AND
DECLARATIONS: HOW ISO STANDARDS HELP (2012), https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites
/isoorg/files/archive/pdf/en/environmental-labelling.pdf.
72. Other organizations, like ISEAL Alliance, are global associations for social and
environmental standards, whose members consist of private entities, NGOs, and
governments that establish and monitor the standards. ISEAL is also privately funded,
with some support from governmental institutions like the World Bank and FAO. But see
DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
REGIMES 148 (2007) (explaining that the GMO case between the EU and the United States
demonstrates that NGOs are also limited in their influence vis-à-vis the state and political
and consumer preferences).
73. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation
Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 505–06 (2009) (describing regulatory arrangements consisting of
firms and industry groups as well as NGOs and members of civil society groups such as
labor unions and socially responsible investors).
74. Id. at 542. For more discussions on New Governance, see also IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4
(Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992); THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW
GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002); Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair,
Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection, 21 L. & POL’Y
49 (1999).
75. For more on IMAFLORA’s mission, see IMAFLORA, Instituto de Manejo e
Certificação Florestal e Agrícola http://www.imaflora.org/imaflora.php (last visited Mar.
15, 2018). For more on Rainforest Alliance, see RAINFOREST ALLIANCE, https://www.
rainforest-alliance.org (last updated 2018). For more on ABIC coffee association, see
ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DA INDÚSTRIA DE CAFÉ, http://abic.com.br/en/ (last visited Mar.
15, 2018). For information on the joint efforts of IMAFLORA and Rainforest Alliance, see
http://imaflora.blogspot.com/2017/10/rainforest-alliance-assume-completa.html. Note that
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The ISO 14000 series environmental standards are readily used to
help set up eco-labeling criteria for organizations that operate ecolabeling schemes for private industries. 76 The ISO has tried to
standardize the principles, practices, and key characteristics relating to
different voluntary environmental labeling types. It provides a forum for
private business to coordinate standards through a market-based form
of regulation based on consumer information. 77 The consensus-based
development of ISO standards also provides a forum for international
dialogue on harmonization of domestic standards. 78
Governments that have their own eco-labeling scheme also may look
to international standards, such as ISO, to set up their own criteria. For
example, the German Blue Angel label was established in 1978 by the
state and continues to be monitored by the state as well. While it is a
voluntary label, it applies to consumer products and services and follows
the international standards found under the ISO and Global
Ecolabelling Network.79 The Blue Angel label has become so
commonplace and prestigious that it has contributed to changing
consumer behavior. The German Federal Environment Agency monitors
these changes and incorporates them into established requirements and
test methods for products.80 In this way, global regulatory norms have
converged with transnational and domestic ones, allowing for some
harmonization and predictability with respect to the use of the Blue
Angel label. It has become one of the most trusted labels in Germany
and is widely used by the private sector and by consumers to determine
the environmental friendliness of the products they are purchasing.
Criteria are developed for each product group, and the German Federal
Environmental Agency requires that companies in Germany constantly

failures of the Rainforest Alliance concerning labor rights have recently been discussed at
Dom Phillips, Coffee from Rainforest Alliance Farms in Brazil Linked to Exploited
Workers, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustain
able-business/2017/jan/04/coffee-rainforest-alliance-utz-brazil-pesticides-exploitedworkers-pay.
76. See, e.g., GLOBAL ECOLABELING NETWORK, https://globalecolabelling.net/ (last
visited Feb. 25, 2018).
77. David A. Wirth, The International Organization for Standardization: Private
Voluntary Standards as Swords and Shields, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 81 (2009).
78. Id. at 85.
79. Blue Angel also is reviewed and adapted according to new scientific information
and needs, and it follows ISO 14020, 140211, 14022, and 14025. See Our Label for the
Environment, BLUE ANGEL, https://www.blauer-engel.de/en/our-label-environment (last
visited Dec. 12, 2017). The Blue Angel label was actually the model for the international
standard, ISO 14020 standard, which is the standard by which many new global
environmental standards have been developed.
80. See id. for success stories of Blue Angel.
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be improving the environmental friendliness of their products. 81 It also
specifies the particular resource that is protected to the greatest extent
by the product. If the product protects the water to the greatest extent,
then the label will have below it an indication to this effect. The four
protection goals include: water, climate, natural resources, and
environmental and health.82
B. Trade and Transnational Regulatory Norms
Transnational regulatory norms are making their way into
international trade agreements, recognizing the relevance of labeling to
trade liberalization. Since the inception of the TBT Agreement and SPS
Agreements in 1994, several WTO cases have addressed labeling. 83
More specifically, cases involving labeling have focused on (1) whether
the state has mandated the use of the label; (2) whether the label is in
accordance to international standards or to an international
standardizing body to which the respondent is a member; and (3)
whether the application of the labeling standard discriminates between
imports and like domestic products. WTO jurisprudence in this regard
has focused primarily on whether the label amounts to a trade
restriction by balancing the discriminatory impacts a label may have on
imports against the legitimate purpose of the label itself. Environmental
standards for labeling schemes that comport to international standards
may be recognized as legitimate for purposes of trade compliance, since

81. See What Is Behind It?, BLUE ANGEL, https://www.blauer-engel.de/en/blueangel/what-is-behind-it (last visited Dec. 12, 2017). The Blue Angel label was actually the
model for the international standard, ISO 14020 standard, which is the standard by which
many new global environmental standards have been developed.
82. See The Logo, BLUE ANGEL, https://www.blauer-engel.de/en/blue-angel/what-isbehind-it/the-logo (last visited Dec. 12, 2017).
83. See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS291, WT/DS292, WT/DS293
(adopted Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter EC – Biotech Products]; First Written Submission,
United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes: Recourse
to Article 22.6 of DSU, WTO Doc. DS406 (adopted Dec. 19, 2013) [hereinafter US – Clove
Cigarettes]; Request for Panel, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL)
Requirements, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/8 (adopted Oct. 9, 2009) (Canada); Request for Panel,
United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling Requirements, WTO Doc. WT/DS386/7
(adopted Oct. 13, 2009) (Mexico); Pane Report, United States—Measures Concerning the
Importation Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R
(adopted Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter US – Tuna Panel Report]; Report of Appellate Body,
United States—Measures Concerning the Importation Marketing and Sale of Tuna and
Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted May 16, 2012) [hereinafter US –
Tuna II AB].
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WTO panels tend to look to international standards for guidance when
adjudicating domestic regulatory measures. 84
When governments use international standards, both the SPS and
TBT agreements, for example, raise a presumption that such schemes
are legitimate and not protectionist. 85 When governments monitor such
regulatory schemes based on other criteria than international
standards, they run a higher risk that such schemes will be in violation
of the trade commitments, especially if those measures are mandatory. 86
Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, for example, encourages governments
to harmonize their sanitary and phytosanitary measures based on
international standards, and creates a presumption of compliance if in
fact those measures do conform with international standards. 87 There is
a presumption of compliance in the TBT Agreement if the technical
regulation comports to international standards, which can be rebutted
with proof that those international standards are ineffective for
fulfilling the legitimate objective of the technical regulation. 88 The TBT
Agreement does not define “international standard.” However, in the
2012 US-Tuna II case, the Appellate Body made significant steps
forward in defining this according to a TBT Committee Decision that
defined the parameters of a legitimate international standardizing body
under the TBT Agreement.89
US-Tuna II was the first time that the WTO ruled on the
interpretation of Article 2.1 and dealt with these fine distinctions
between state-centered “mandatory” regulations versus voluntary
standards that tend to be anchored in the private sector. Both the Panel
and the AB were willing to look to international standards and the ISO
84. US-Tuna II, supra note 56.
85. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 3,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 2.4, Apr.
15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120. The same is true under NAFTA. North American Free Trade
Agreement, arts. 701–724, 901–915, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289.
86. See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products, supra note 86 (ruling that an EU moratorium on the
approval of biotech products as well as national marketing and import bans regarding
genetically modified organisms were in violation of GATT); see also Joint Communication,
European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WTO Doc. WT/DS26/28 (Sept. 30, 2009).
87. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, supra note
85, art. 3(1)–(2), annex A(3).
88. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 85, art. 2.4, annex 1
(explaining standards under the Agreement must be approved by a recognized body, and
that the ISO/IEC Guide 2 is used for guidance in defining standards and technical
regulations); see also US-Tuna I, supra note 52.
89. See US-Tuna II, supra note 56, at ¶¶ 353–54; see also Trujillo, A Dialogical
Approach, supra note 47, at 56162.
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definitions in interpreting provisions under the TBT Agreement. Recent
free trade agreements encourage the establishment of voluntary
mechanisms of environmental regulation by the private sector. 90 After
US-Tuna II, though, it is unclear how much state oversight will convert
an otherwise “voluntary” regulation into a mandatory one for purposes
of the TBT Agreement. The US-Tuna II decision, finding the U.S.
labeling scheme mandatory, seems to imply that virtually any state
action may in fact turn a labeling scheme into a mandatory technical
regulation.91 Arguably, though, private voluntary standards would not
raise questions of trade compliance since trade focuses on state action
rather than private action, unless the state is involved in the
enforcement of those voluntary standards.
Trade regimes are also influencing the ways in which modern
environmental regulation is developing, encouraging market-driven
mechanisms that are voluntary at the regional level and harmonization
of environmental standards at the multilateral level. This is nicely
depicted in the TPP as well as drafts of the TTIP agreement. The CETA,
recently ratified by the EU and Canada, contains separate chapters on
Sustainable Development, the Environment, and Labor, containing
specific provisions regarding the need for trade to be flexible so as to
allow governments to implement climate change and clean energy
mitigation policies.92 Some of these international standards are making
their way into domestic legislation and domestic standards, and, as in
the case of Blue Angel, have also influenced the character of
international standards. For example, in 2016 the German government
decided to make its National Sustainable Development Strategy “a key
framework for achieving the SDG’s in Germany.”93
Germany presented its first National Sustainable Development
Strategy in 2002, which included national sustainability goals and
indicators, and continued to consult with civil society groups and
reported its progress. Germany has a Council for Sustainable
Development, an independent advisory council which oversees the
creation and implementation of sustainable development strategies. It
released the third edition of the Sustainability Code, which is intended
90. See, e.g., US-Tuna II, supra note 56, at ¶¶ 353–54; United States-Colombia Trade
Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., art. 18.5, Nov. 22, 2006, 125 Stat. 462; United StatesPeru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, art. 18.5, Apr. 12, 2006, 121 Stat. 1455;
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, art. 17.4,
Aug. 2, 2005, 43 I.L.M. 514.
91. See US-Tuna II, supra note 56, at ¶¶ 193–94.
92. See infra Part IV.A.2(b).
93. See REPORT OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO THE HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL
FORUM ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 2016 (2016), https://sustainabledevelopment.un
.org/content/documents/10686HLPF-Bericht_final_EN.pdf.
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to provide companies with guidance regarding its strategic orientation
toward incorporating sustainable development standards and provide
customers and investors more transparency for making important
business decisions concerning sustainable development. Though the
Code was developed in Germany and created voluntary standards, it is
tied to voluntary international reporting standards, making it suitable
for companies doing business globally.94 Many of the tools in the Code
are with respect to company disclosures on areas concerning natural
resource management, greenhouse gas emissions, product management,
and stakeholder engagement, as well as other sustainable development
goals concerning disclosures on labor standards and ensuring human
rights standards for different levels of business supply chains. 95
These are good examples of ways in which transnational regulatory
networks have evolved into more formalized institutions for developing
and implementing new standards fit for the twenty-first century. They
are bottom-up in the sense that they have local and domestic
governance structures, but they “dialogue” outside their jurisdictions
with other standards-setting entities such as civil society, other state
regulators, and within the international arena. International
agreements, like the 2015 Paris Summit Agreement, also provide a
more formal multilateral framework for countries to dialogue with each
other on their progress regarding domestic decarbonization strategies
and to report (every five years) on this progress. 96 International trade,
particularly through preferential trade agreements, is responding to
these global concerns for climate change and the need to comply with
sustainable development goals by incorporating provisions that attempt
to address these concerns and recognize the need for international trade
to become more flexible in allowing domestic sustainable development
strategies.

94. See GERMAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE SUSTAINABILITY CODE:
BENCHMARKING SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS 7–9 (4th rev. ed. 2017), https://www.deutschernachhaltigkeitskodex.de/fileadmin/user_upload/dnk/dok/kodex/The_SustainabilityCode_20
17.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.unfccc.int/files/ho
me/application/pdf/paris_agreement.pdf.
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III. PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND TRANSNATIONAL
REGULATION
A. Transnational Regulatory Cooperation Bodies as Models: NAFTA,
TPP, CETA, and TTIP
1. NAFTA
History informs us that bilateral and regional negotiations of trade
and investment agreements can serve as models for future multilateral
commitments. In some cases, like NAFTA, concurrent negotiations can
influence one another and even recognize the other agreement. NAFTA
negotiations and the Uruguay Round negotiations were happening
around the same time, both being enacted in January 1994. NAFTA
affirmed the existing rights and obligations of parties to the GATT,
incorporating specific provisions of the GATT, such as the GATT
National Treatment provision for market access of goods, 97 and the TBT
Agreement for its chapter on Standard Related Measures, within the
parameters of its own understandings of national treatment under
Article 904.98 Interestingly, the NAFTA SPS measures chapter also
recognizes, in part, the obligations and rights of the GATT on the
parties, but specifically excludes national treatment obligations of
Article 301 (which refers to the GATT) and provisions of Article XX (b)
of the GATT. It is also stricter than the SPS Agreement in some aspects,
allowing parties to have more restrictive SPS measures than
international standards99 and incorporating its own definitions of
discriminatory action.100 It specifically takes into account “technical and
economic feasibility” in determining the necessity threshold for a party’s
measure in furthering the regulatory goal.101 The NAFTA SPS chapter
also recognizes a temporary precautionary principle allowed only for a
limited period of time when the science is uncertain around a
measure.102 These allowances in NAFTA reflected the concern at the
time by environmental and health interest groups in the United States
that environmental and safety standards would race to the bottom as a

97. See North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 301, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057,
32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
98. See id. art. 903–04.
99. See id. art. 713(2)(3).
100. See id. art. 712.
101. See id. art. 712(5).
102. See id. art. 712(4).
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result of trade, especially because of different standards in Mexico. 103 It
was also the first U.S. regional agreement of its kind and served as a
model for many of the subsequent U.S. free trade agreements, like the
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).
However one perceives the relative influence of regional
negotiations for setting standards for future trade agreements and
regulatory tolerance, NAFTA had a regulatory impact on Mexico. In
some instances, it led Mexico to increase its labor and environmental
standards; in others, it resulted in an influx of U.S. goods, including
food products, into Mexico, which had mixed consequences for Mexico’s
local production, especially in agriculture.104 Though no formal,
overriding, regulatory cooperation body was formed at the time of
NAFTA, transnational regulatory networks found a home in some of the
side committees and agreements developed alongside or immediately
after NAFTA. The focus was on capacity building, especially for Mexico,
and U.S. regulators were instrumental in aiding Mexican regulators to
improve and/or develop their own regulatory structures, many of which
reflected U.S. standards.105 For environmental issues, some regulatory
cooperation developed through the North American Agreement for
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the Commission of
Environmental Cooperation (CEC). Also, regulatory cooperation
continued in specific areas through the La Paz and Boundary Waters
Treaties (for U.S.-Mexico) and the renegotiation of the Canada U.S.
Boundary Waters Treaty aimed primarily at managing the Great Lakes.
As of 2010, the United States entered into separate negotiations
with Canada and Mexico to establish High-Level Regulatory
Cooperation Councils, comprised of senior-level regulatory, trade, and
foreign affairs officials. These function more as transnational networks,
103. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Environment in Peril?, in IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION,
135–61 (2007) (finding that concerns of environmental race to the bottom were not as
dramatic as a result of free trade as originally anticipated).
104. By 1991, about two-thirds of the government-controlled industries were sold.
Deregulation of the industries stimulated foreign investment. NAFTA solidified a trend in
Mexico to replace import substitution programs with export promotion. Agricultural
reforms in Mexico, begun in the 1980s to eliminate agricultural subsidies, expanded into
the 1990s. Between 1990 and 1991, import controls and government direct price supports
to the producer of nine of the eleven basic crops were abolished, and subsidies granted to
agricultural inputs, credit, and insurance were drastically reduced. See MARK WEISBROT,
STEPHEN LEFEBVRE, & JOSEPH SAMMUT, DID NAFTA HELP MEXICO? AN ASSESSMENT
AFTER 20 YEARS 13 (2014) (discussing the trends in Mexico brought about by NAFTA).
105. See Raustiala, supra note 65, at 44–46. After NAFTA, Mexico created a new
enforcement office, Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente (PROFEPA) to enforce
regulatory standards for management of border environmental issues. See id. at 47.
PROFEPA’s scope is broader today, also managing natural resources, maritime resources,
as well as forestry. See PROFEPA, http://www.profepa.gob.mx (last visited Dec. 12, 2017).
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comprised of working groups from the regulatory agencies of each
country, than formal regulatory bodies, as are being discussed in the
TTIP. However, they promise to have impact in enhanced regulatory
convergence between the United States and Canada and the United
States and Mexico.106 The U.S.-Mexico High-Level Regulatory
Cooperation Council Work Plan identified seven key areas of mutual
interest: “food safety, E-certification for plants and plant products,
trucking safety, nanomaterials, E-health, oil and gas, and conformity
assessment.”107 The purpose was to make regulations more compatible;
increase simplification and transparency; as well as enhance technical
cooperation. The Work Plan also included “Food Safety Modernization,”
which extends to the production, processing, and handling of food being
exported and imported.108 It was also intended to engage stakeholders,
including industry associations. The oil and gas working groups focus on
Mexico’s hydrocarbons resources in the Gulf of Mexico, including ways
of minimizing risk in exploration activities as well as emergency
response plans, auditing and inspection, and training.
Between the United States and Canada, the regulatory cooperation
is focused on several areas of common interest, including natural
resources and pipeline management; natural gas use in transportation
of vehicles; food safety (with reciprocal recognition of each other’s food
safety systems); and energy efficiency standards. There is an emphasis
on information sharing of regulations but also of policy reviews so as to
enhance regulatory cooperation. Stakeholder participation, including
industry associations, is also recognized as important. Information that
is considered business proprietary shall remain confidential and not
publicly disseminated.109 The Council will also be made up of the central
agencies of each country, including the trade and foreign affairs
agencies. By establishing these regulatory cooperation councils as an
extension of NAFTA and including participation of the trade and foreign
affairs agencies of the respective parties, there is an explicit political
106. For the SPP Regulatory Cooperation Framework, the three countries will work
together in a “Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America.” See
CANADA/UNITED STATES/MEXICO SPP REGULATORY COOPERATION FRAMEWORK, https://ob
amawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/spp_regulatory_cooperation_fr
amework.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
107. UNITED STATES-MEXICO REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL: PROGRESS REPORT
TO LEADERS 3 (2013), https://www.trade.gov/hlrcc/ (click “HLRCC – Progress Report –
August 2013” to begin download).
108. See id. at 8.
109. See DEP’T OF NAT. RES. OF CANADA’S EXPLOSIVES SAFETY AND SEC. BRANCH ET AL.,
U.S.-CANADA REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL REGULATORY PARTNERSHIP STATEMENT
2, https://www.trade.gov/rcc/documents/j-rps-nrcan-dot-phmsa-rps.pdf (last visited Dec.
13, 2017).
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and jurisdictional recognition that regulation and trade go hand in
hand, further bringing the trade and regulatory discourses together into
the same normative realm. This trend toward normative convergence
continued into the TPP and the TTIP phase of trade governance.
It is unclear whether the Trump Administration will continue the
work of the North American Regulatory Cooperation Councils. As of the
writing of this article, they were still in place, though NAFTA is under
renegotiations.110 Recently, the Canadian American Business Council
published a statement arguing in favor of ensuring the permanence of
the Council.111 Regarding the U.S.-Mexico Regulatory Council, a
workplan was put into place in February 2016. 112 President Nieto and
President Obama had already established in 2013 a U.S.-Mexico High
Level Economic Dialogue to advance strategic economic priorities. 113
The Trump Administration seems to have an anti-regulatory position,
given recent executive orders impacting several agencies. 114 However, it
seems to be more focused on diminishing funding and staff and on
reducing the enforcement of regulations, rather than on repealing
them.115

110. See, e.g., Sarah McGregor, Josh Wingrove & Eric Martin, Trump Swings into
Action on Trade, Adds Edge to NAFTA Talks, BLOOMBERG POL. (Jan. 23, 2018, 1:35 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-23/trump-swings-into-action-on-tradeadding-edge-to-nafta-talks; Josh Wingrove, NAFTA Trio to Gather in Davos as
Negotiations Resume in Canada, BLOOMBERG POL. (Jan. 15, 2018, 11:25 AM)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-15/nafta-trio-to-gather-in-davos-asnegotiations-resume-in-canada.
111. See Statement by the Canadian American Business Council on Canada/US Trade
and Border Relations, CISION (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive
/January2017/25/c6195.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2017).
112. The second work plan was also referenced in a February 25, 2016 White House
press release, see Office of the Vice President, Joint Statement: 2016 U.S.-Mexico HighLevel Dialogue, OBAMAWHITEHOUSE.ARCHIVES.GOV (Feb. 25, 2016), https://obamawhiteho
use.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/25/joint-statement-2016-us-mexico-high-leveleconomic-dialogue.
113. See High Level Economic Dialogue: Fact Sheet, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
https://www.trade.gov/hled/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2017).
114. See Tal Kopan, Here’s What Trump’s Budget Proposes to Cut, CNN (Mar. 16, 2017, 1:21
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/16/politics/trump-budget-cuts/ (discussing executive orders
significantly reducing the budgets of over ten agencies, with the environmental protection
agency having the steepest cut of 31.4%).
115. See Rachel Augustine Potter, Why Trump Can’t Undo the Regulatory State So
Easily, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/whytrump-cant-undo-the-regulatory-state-so-easily/ (stating, “an alternative to repealing
regulations will be for the administration simply to decline to enforce those rules that are
already on the books. Feeble enforcement is harder for courts and other actors to counter
than formal deregulation.”).
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2. “Formal” Collaboration: Transnational Regulatory Cooperation
after 2010
Aside from recent U.S. shifts in trade and regulatory policies, the
less formal nature of transnational regulatory cooperation continues
and is becoming more formalized through preferential trade
agreements, as has been demonstrated in sustainable development
agenda for EU states as well as in the CETA. 116 These create more
structured means of transnational dialogue with regard to regulatory
convergence and harmonization.
Similarly, in this era of plurilateral agreements, the TPP and TTIP
are models of the ways in which trade agreements can have intense
regulatory impact not only on the countries involved but also for
nonparticipating countries. As has been observed above, there are
differences in the TPP and CETA provisions, especially regarding the
rigor of sustainable development, environment, and labor provisions.
But it is also interesting to note that the participants in these
agreements are different. Though there may be a general assumption
that the United States is more deferential to private interests and,
therefore, less willing to invoke stricter environmental standards, the
TPP contains less stringent provisions regarding sustainable
development and the environment than the EU draft for the TTIP. This
is because of the large number of parties coming from the developing
world, which are reluctant to embrace stricter environmental standards
for fear that they will impede their economic development.
a. TPP
Despite this concern, as compared to earlier U.S. free trade
agreements with developing countries, the TPP contemplates areas of
public concern more generously than in the past.117 For example, the
labor chapter adheres to ILO standards and condemns the use of
unhealthy working standards.118 It prohibits derogation from these
obligations, even for the sake of trade and investment. 119 Both the
environmental and labor chapters contain provisions regarding
corporate social responsibility.120 As compared to CETA, it is notable
that the TPP contains weaker provisions around sustainable
development and is ambiguous in incorporating the precautionary
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See, e.g., THE GERMAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., supra note 94.
See references cited supra note 2.
See TPP, supra note 45, arts. 19.2, 19.3, 19.6.
See id. art. 19.4.
See id. arts. 19.7 (labor), 20.10 (environment).
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principle or in clarifying a position on process production methods.
Furthermore, much like other recent U.S. free trade agreements,
voluntary mechanisms to enhance environmental performance are
specifically encouraged.121 Joint cooperation on setting regulatory
standards will be part of the TPP as well.122 The omission of the
precautionary principle is not only consistent with the U.S. preference
for the “substantial equivalence” standard, but also reflects a hesitancy
on the side of developing countries, including Mexico, to incorporate
such provisions. One need only look to the reports from the negotiations
of the Havana Charter to be reminded that developing countries, like
Mexico, did not want to include specific environmental issues, such as
the conservation of fisheries as part of the exceptions allowed under
Article XX of the GATT.123 The fact that the TPP mentions the
protection of the marine environment from ship pollution is a step
toward convergence with environmental concerns for the trade
community, even for the developing countries participating in the
agreement.124 Interestingly, Article 20.13 of the TPP recognizes the
parties’ commitment to biodiversity, including the “sustainable use of
biodiversity.” However, it also reiterates a commitment to “facilitating
access to genetic resources within their respective national
jurisdictions.”125 The current TTIP draft, on the other hand, encourages
mutual recognition of each region’s regulations, which, in theory, would
allow the U.S. and the EU to maintain their respective regulatory
preferences, even in the area of food safety.
The weak jurisprudence by the WTO on the precautionary
principle126 also reflects this tension between the developing and
121. See id. art. 20.11.
122. See id. art. 20.12(2) (“Taking account of their national priorities and circumstances,
and available resources, the Parties shall cooperate to address matters of joint or common
interest among the participating Parties related to the implementation of this Chapter,
when there is mutual benefit from that cooperation.”).
123. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Reports of Committees and
Principal Sub-Committees, U.N. Doc. ICITO I/8, at 84–85, ¶¶ 18, 21 (Sept. 1948)
[hereinafter Havana Reports].
124. See TPP, supra note 45, art. 20.6 (Protection of the Marine Environment from Ship
Pollution). The CETA has broader provisions on the protection of marine life and fisheries.
See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement arts. 7.3, 7.4, 24.11, Oct. 30, 2016,
[hereinafter CETA], http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10973-2016-INIT/en
/pdf.
125. See TPP, supra note 45, art. 20.13(4). This provision also recognizes the importance
of respecting the practices of indigenous communities. See id. art. 20.13(3).
126. Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, supra note 83 (stating that the WTO cannot rule on the
EU’s use of the precautionary principle because it is not a recognized rule of international
customary law).
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developed world when it comes to the environment and international
trade relationship: Stricter environmental standards, especially
regarding the ways in which goods are produced, translate into more
expensive levels of production and more obstacles for economic
development. This old tug of war, first reflected in US-Tuna I between
the United States and Mexico, continues into today’s discussions around
an Agreement on Environmental Goods and Services and development.
It is not so surprising that a trade agreement between Canada and the
European Union would have more rigorous provisions in this regard
than the TPP.
b. CETA and TTIP
The Canadian-European Union Trade Agreement’s (CETA) chapter
on the environment does not contain a precautionary principle per se,127
but it does recognize that the “lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.”128 It also has a separate chapter on trade
and sustainable development, as well as separate chapters on trade and
labor and trade and environment.129 In recognizing the relevance of the
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and other
relevant agreements, CETA’s Chapter on Sustainable Development
states “that economic development, social development and
environmental protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing
components of sustainable development” and that trade should promote
sustainable development.130 One of the challenges for sustainable
development is finding international consensus on defining it. 131 The
CETA attempts to do so, at least in the context of trade, when it states
that part of the parties’ understanding about what constitutes the
127. See generally CETA, supra note 124, art. 24.8(2) (“The Parties acknowledge that
where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, the lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.”).
128. Id.
129. See id. chs. 23–24. Prior drafts of CETA contained a precautionary principle as well
as sub-chapters on trade and labor and trade and environment, as part of the larger
chapter on trade and sustainable development. The EU has given up on the precautionary
principle, despite it being part of the EU policy, in other free trade agreements, such as
with South Korea, Peru, and Colombia.
130. See id. ch. 22.
131. The Brundtland Report defines sustainability as “development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs.” Secretary General, Report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/42/427, annex, at 41 (Aug. 4, 1987) [hereinafter Brundtland
Report].
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objective of sustainable development, is that it is “for the welfare of
present and future generations.”132 It also states: “The Parties
acknowledge that where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, the lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.”133 Furthermore, the chapters on environment and on labor
recognize the parties’ right to regulate the environment and to strive to
improve environmental regulation,134 and that they shall not derogate
from environmental protection for the sake of encouraging trade and
investment.135
The Sustainable Development chapter also recognizes the value for
international coordination and “the integration at the international
level of economic, social and environmental development and protection
initiatives, actions and measure.”136 The parties also assert that “trade
should promote sustainable development,”137 which is a leap for
international trade agreements when it comes to the intersection of the
two camps.
The means for achieving this are varied, but the use of voluntary
mechanisms for regulation are encouraged in CETA.138 The TBT chapter
in the CETA incorporates parts of the WTO TBT Agreement (as the SPS
chapter also incorporates parts of the WTO SPS Agreement) and forms
a committee for enhanced coordination among regulatory bodies
between the EU and Canada with respect to TBT measures, which can
impact environmental regulation especially if labeling mechanisms are
used as tools for such voluntary regulation. 139
A Committee on Sustainable Development is formed under Chapter
22:4, consisting of representatives of the parties responsible for matters
132. See CETA, supra note 124, art. 22.1. It further states: “[Recalling] the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992, the Agenda 21 on Environment
and Development of 1992, the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development of
2002 and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development of
2002, the Ministerial Declaration of the United Nations Economic and Social Council on
Creating an environment at the national and international levels conducive to generating
full and productive employment and decent work for all, and its impact on sustainable
development of 2006, and the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalisation of
2008.”
133. See id. art. 24.8(2).
134. See id. chs. 23–24 (discussing trade and labor and trade and environment in the
context of CETA).
135. See id. chs. 8 (9), 24 (5).
136. Id. art. 22.3(1).
137. Id. art. 22.3(2).
138. Id.
139. See id. arts. 6.3 (release of goods), 6.4 (customs valuation), 6.6 (fees and charges),
6.8 (automation).
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under the environment and labor chapters. Interestingly, this
committee will oversee the implementation of those chapters, “including
cooperative activities,” and “address in an integrated manner any
matter of common interest to the Parties in relation to the interface
between economic development, social development and environmental
protection.”140 The Environment chapter establishes a Panel of Experts
that can be convened when disagreement cannot be resolved through
consultations.141 CETA also emphasizes that trade should not
undermine the environment, but rather promote it through the
recognition, for example, of environmental goods and services. 142 It has
special provisions concerning climate change and renewable energy and
the need for domestic strategies to promote the mitigation of climate
change.143 Furthermore, it recognizes “promotion of life-cycle
management of goods, including carbon accounting and end-of-life
management, extended producer-responsibility, recycling and reduction
of waste, and other best practice.”144 This is the first time a trade
agreement is this explicit regarding these issues as being part of the
international trade legal framework.
Though the negotiation of the TTIP has been put on hold
indefinitely, the textual proposal of the “Horizontal Chapter” provides
some information for the role of the Regulatory Cooperation Body. 145
Furthermore, a look at the CETA chapter on regulatory cooperation,
which also recognizes the right of nations to regulate, gives insight into
the European Union and Canadian positions on such type of cooperation
for future EU trade agreements and, in the case of Canada, for the
NAFTA renegotiations.146 Considering the public concern around such
trade agreements’ lower regulatory standards, it is also helpful to
consider such a regulatory cooperation board in the context of other
chapters on sustainable development, the environment, and even the
TBT and SPS chapters. These latter chapters also create coordinating
bodies around technical regulations, phytosanitary measures, and
environmental regulations. By establishing a Sustainable Development
140. Id. art. 22.4(1).
141. See id. art. 24.15.
142. See id. art. 24.9.
143. See id. art. 24.12(d)–(f).
144. Id. art. 24.12(h).
145. See Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, E.U.-U.S., art. 5, made
public May 4, 2015, [hereinafter TTIP] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march
/tradoc_154377.pdf.
146. See CETA, supra note 124, at ch. 21. Canada is more likely to ask for right to
regulate provisions in the revised NAFTA as well as more concessions regarding climate
change mitigation efforts, since it remains a member of the Paris Climate Agreement, and
on hydropower trade with the Unites States.

398

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 25:1

Committee that oversees the environment and labor chapters, the
CETA explicitly links the sustainable development chapter to the
environment and labor one and requires that the relevant committees
work with one another, creating a transnational “shared regulatory
space.” Chapter Twenty-Five creates a less formal cooperative platform
to encourage bilateral dialogue dealing exclusively with fisheries,
forestries, raw materials, and biotechnology. It will consist of co-chairs
who will report to the CETA joint committee established under Chapter
Twenty-Six.147 The CETA joint committee consists of representatives
from Canada and the European Union, and the chairs shall be the
Minister of International Trade of Canada and a Member of the
European Commission responsible for trade. There is no explicit
provision linking the CETA Joint Committee in Chapter Twenty-Six of
ETA to the other regulatory committees; however, the scope section of
this chapter authorizes the CETA Joint Committee to delegate issues to
more specialized committees created in the other chapters (i.e.,
Sustainable Development) and communicate with all interested parties,
“including private sector and civil society organizations.”148 CETA also
establishes a number of specialized agencies, including a regulatory
cooperation forum, which addresses matters of regulatory
cooperation.149 Decisions of the CETA Joint Committee shall be binding
on the parties.150
The Regulatory Cooperation Board in the negotiated TPP does not
make this textual and substantive leap. It does create a Board that will
be influential in coordinating regulatory measures across sectors and
member countries, but remains elusive as to its relative authority to
deal with specific regulatory measures regarding phytosanitary
measures and food products, for example. Furthermore, the TPP does
not have a separate chapter on sustainable development and is not as
explicit as to what it means by this term, as is found in the CETA. The

147. The Regulatory Cooperation Board is no longer used as in earlier versions. Instead,
a CETA joint committee is established; however, regulatory cooperation is discussed in
various chapters with respect to having bilateral cooperation and dialogue on various
regulations. See CETA, supra note 124, art. 26.1.
148. See id. art. 26.5. It is also important to note that the TBT and phytosanitary
measures chapters in CETA both incorporate the WTO, TBT, and SPS agreements as the
guiding agreement relevant to the CETA treatment of TBT and SPS measures. The TPP
does not do this. Rather, it recognizes the commitments of the Parties to the SPS
Agreement, and specifically incorporates certain sections of the TBT Agreement into the
TPP. See, e.g., CETA, supra note 124, arts. 5.15.14; TPP, supra note 45, arts. 7.2, 7.4
(SPS), 8.4 (TBT).
149. See CETA, supra note 124, art. 26.2(1)(h).
150. See id. art. 26.3.
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CETA’s chapter on environment recognizes commitments under several
multilateral environmental agreements. 151
Whereas the TPP is consistent with NAFTA and subsequent U.S.
free trade agreements regarding the TBT and SPS chapters, though the
TPP arguably goes a little further in some aspects like clarifying the
role of science and risk, the CETA goes farther in dealing with issues
not addressed explicitly in prior trade agreements. If in fact TTIP
negotiations were to recommence, it is unclear whether it will contain
the more rigorous provisions on these issues concerning sustainable
development and the environment of CETA or whether it will have
weaker provisions as are found in the TPP. Given that the European
Union has concluded the CETA and is in the process of concluding other
preferential trade agreements that contain similar provisions, 152 it is
likely that sustainable development, regulatory coordination, and the
right to regulate provisions will become the “new norm” and leave the
U.S. position on these issues behind. The question will remain as to the
balance of trade liberalization and environmental issues—whether the
future of economic relations will continue to contain the same discourse,
with the scales tipping toward free trade, or whether regulatory
coordination, as we see in the CETA, will lead to more allowances by the
trade community for enhanced regulation, whether public or private,
even if this implicates restraints on trade. Though this paper does not
focus on the ways that these trends in trade impact the role of executive
authority in Europe, the transnational nature of regulatory cooperation
in trade clearly does play an important role in expanding the authority
of the European Commission on its Member States. 153
3. Closer Look at Regulatory Cooperation for Environmental
Regulation and Sustainable Development
Though regulatory cooperation and sustainable development
provisions in the TPP did not go as far as in the CETA or TTIP, the TPP
demonstrated an important step by the U.S. government to broaden the
scope of trade in this context. In the Environment chapter of the TPP,
Article 20.11 recognized that voluntary mechanisms, and the “voluntary
151. See id. art. 24.4.
152. For a list of current negotiations on EU trade agreements, including modifications
to its agreements with Mexico and MERCOSUR and new agreements with Japan, China,
and other countries in Asia, see Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations, EUR.
COMMISSION, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf (last
updated Nov. 2017).
153. See, e.g., Elliot Posner, Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory
Cooperation at the Turn of the Millennium, 63 INT”L ORG. 665 (2009).
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sharing of information and expertise, and public-private partnerships,
can contribute to the achievement and maintenance of high levels of
environmental protection and complement domestic regulatory
measures.”154 It encouraged the TPP member states (the Parties) to use
voluntary standards for the protection of natural resources and
environment in the territory. This trend is consistent with its other
recent U.S. free trade agreements, such as U.S.-Peru and U.S.Columbia, which also contain provisions encouraging the use of freemarket principles for environmental regulation. 155 Chapter Twenty of
the TPP went even further. It also asked that authorities, the private
sector, civil society, and other stakeholders already involved in the
development of such standards continue. 156 It encouraged parties to
ensure that such standards were developed truthfully, taking into
account scientific and technical expertise; were based on international
standards; allowed for competition and innovation; and did not
discriminate on the basis of origin.157 Furthermore, cooperation among
stakeholders was required and a Committee on the Environment was
created to ensure such cooperation.158 This was a separate committee
from the Regulatory Coherence Committee set up in Chapter TwentyFive of the TPP.159
The CETA chapter on sustainable development also promotes the
use of voluntary schemes for production, such as in areas like ecolabeling and fair practices. However, it asks the parties to consider
sustainability “in private and public consumption decisions.” 160 This
CETA chapter also goes one step further. It encourages parties, in
addressing sustainable development issues, to conduct assessments,
domestically but also jointly, around the “potential economic, social and
environmental impacts of possible actions, taking account of the views
of stakeholders.”161
There were reports of the TTIP claiming that the TTIP would
contain a chapter on sustainable development, as well as on energy and
raw materials.162 The TPP contained provisions on sustainable
154. See TPP, supra note 45, art. 20.11(1).
155. See, e.g., United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 90;
United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 90.
156. See TPP, supra note 45, arts. 20.1.23.
157. See TPP, supra note 45, art. 20.11(2)–(3).
158. See id. art. 20.12.
159. See id. art. 25.6.
160. CETA, supra note 124, art. 22.3(2)(c).
161. Id.
162. Note the 2015 Guardian report with leaked text that said that environment took on
a lesser role. The old version was scrapped and a November 6th report after the Miami
meeting stated that more vigorous provisions would be in the draft. See Arthur Neslen,
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development in the general commitments and objectives sections of the
Environment chapter, as well as provisions on natural resources and
carbon emissions. However, the EU draft seemed to define sustainable
development more broadly than the TPP, including not only
environmental concerns but also those of labor and climate change. It
focused on the right of governments to continue to regulate in areas of
environmental protection and labor, with adherence to international
agreements like the ILO in the case of labor. It is unclear whether there
would be mention of voluntary mechanisms for regulation, but it is clear
that the European Union is concerned about the ability of Member
states to continue to regulate.163
As EU trade negotiations evolve and the rise in voluntary forms of
regulation on them continues, albeit to different degrees on either side
of the Atlantic, different understandings of what constitutes regulation,
the right to regulate, and risk assessment emerge. This divergence is at
the core of the regulatory differences between the United States and the
European Union. For purposes of trade and the WTO, it is state action
that must be disciplined in order to avoid protectionism that can impede
free trade. The WTO’s scope is not to oversee private action of corporate
actors, but rather to discipline government behavior.
IV. CHALLENGES AHEAD
A. The U.S./EU Regulatory Divide and Its Impact on the Developing
World
Where government oversight is involved, especially if mandatory,
there is an increased likelihood of such measures being construed as
trade barriers for the WTO dispute settlement body. The EC-Biotech
case, involving EU regulations on imports of “biotech products,” which
also contained intricate administrative procedures for approval of such
products before entering the European Union as well as labeling
requirements as part of their marketing,164 raised this issue of

TTIP: EU Negotiators Appear to Break Environment Pledge in Leaked Draft, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2015, 12:16 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/oct/23/tt
ip-eu-negotiators-appear-to-break-environmental-pledge-in-leaked-draft.
163. See Andrew Walker, TTIP: Why the EU-US Trade Deal Matters, BBC NEWS (May
13, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32691589; see also Jennifer Rankin, Doubts
Rise Over TTIP as France Threatens to Block EU-US Deal, THE GUARDIAN (May 3, 2016,
11:26 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/03/doubts-rise-over-ttip-asfrance-threatens-to-block-eu-us-deal.
164. See Council Directive 2001/18/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1 (EC) (repealing Council
Directive 90/200/EEC); Council Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L 43) 1 (EC) (repealing
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mandatory government oversight. In 2009, the United States began
consultations regarding EU restrictions on the import of poultry treated
with any substance other than water without EU approval. 165 These
regulations also included measures for marketing the poultry, requiring
that the poultry indicate that it has not undergone any other chemical
treatment. Because of the inherent differences in the ways the United
States and the European Union perceive the role of government in
overseeing the implementation of labels and their different views of the
need to protect the consumer from genetically modified organisms or
other chemical treatments to foods, the United States and European
Union have achieved little in coming to an agreement on trade of these
products.166 Furthermore, WTO litigation around these issues has only
exacerbated the conflict and resulted in the European Union and the
United States not finding a bilateral solution. In this context, normative
conflict has not resulted in convergence, at least not in the short-term.
Rather, the two regions have expanded their differing standards into
the developing world.167
Developing countries in trading relationships with either the United
States or the European Union are compelled to follow one or the other’s
GMO position or else lose a potential market for their agricultural
products.168 In this way, the European Union and the United States
have influenced food standards in other countries, especially developing
countries. Argentina, for example, is the third largest grower of biotech
products and user of GMOs in their food products, after Brazil and the
United States.169 Mexico has restrictions on the use of GMO products,
but has been slowly loosening these, as a result of (1) cross-pollination
coming from U.S. agricultural imports containing GMOs; 170 and (2)

Council Directive 90/200/EEC); see also Panel Report, European Communities—Measures
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, supra note 83.
165. See Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities—
Certain Measures Affecting Poultry Meat and Poultry Meat Products from the United
States, WTO Doc. WT/DS389/1 (Jan. 20, 2009).
166. For general overview of the difference in regulatory processes for the US and EU,
see generally RICHARD PARKER & ALBERTO ALEMANNO, TOWARDS EFFECTIVE REGULATORY
COOPERATION UNDER TTIP: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE EU AND US LEGISLATIVE
AND REGULATORY SYSTEMS (2014), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc
_152466.pdf.
167. See DREZNER, supra note 72, at 149–75.
168. See id. at 169.
169. GLOB. LEGAL RESEARCH CTR., LAW LIBRARY OF CONG., RESTRICTIONS ON
GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS 1 (2014), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-ongmos/restrictions-on-gmos.pdf.
170. See id. at 126.
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recent pressure from its close northern neighbor, due to the U.S.-run
corn intensive high fructose syrup industry in Mexico.171
A Mexican case, involving Monsanto and other U.S. food producers,
reflects this tension over GMOs. In 2013, a federal judge in Mexico City
decided to temporarily halt new GMO corn permits in an effort to
protect biodiversity and the variety of native Mexican maize species,
many of which have been contaminated as a result of the introduction of
GMO corn from the United States.172 This decision was overturned by
Mexico’s XII District Court.173 This decision came after two years of
ninety-three appeals by primarily U.S. biotech companies following the
2013 ban by the Twelfth Federal District Court for Civil Matters. Most
African nations, on the other hand, have stricter policies on GMO
agricultural products due to their dependence on the European Union as
a primary food supplier.174 No consensus has been achieved as to
whether the better food standard includes GMOs or not. Clearly for the
European Union, food safety should exclude GMOs. Yet at the heart of
the WTO Biotech case was not only the different regulatory values
regarding food safety and the use of GMOs, but also the distinct
approaches to risk and risk assessment processes at the domestic or
regional level between the two continents. The United States adheres to
a “sufficient scientific evidence” standard, whereas the European Union
holds fast to the “precautionary principle,” reflecting a strong
“divergence of preferences” at the regulatory level of both continents,

171. See Tim Johnson, Sugar War Between Mexico, U.S. Threatens Broader Trade
Relations, MCCLATCHY DC BUREAU (Apr. 28, 2014, 12:07 PM), http://www.mcclatchydc
.com/news/nation-world/world/article24766822.html.
172. David Alire Garcia, Past and Future Collide as Mexico Fights Over GMO Corn,
REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2013, 3:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-corn/pastand-future-collide-as-mexico-fights-over-gmo-corn-idUSBRE9AB11Q20131112; see also
Tribunal Federal Suspende Toda la Siembra de Maíz Fransgénico, SEMILLAS DE VIDA (Oct.
10, 2013), http://www.semillasdevida.org.mx/index.php/documentos/articulos/93-boletinesde-prensa/86-articulo-2-muestra; David Alire Garcia, Monsanto Sees Prolonged Delay on
GMO Corn Permits in Mexico, REUTERS NEWS (Jan. 30, 2017, 8:07 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-monsanto/monsanto-sees-prolonged-delay-ongmo-corn-permits-in-mexico-idUSKBN15E1DJ.
173. Alfredo Acedo, Mexico’s GMO Corn Ban and the Glyphosate Cancer Findings,
ORGANIC CONSUMERS ASS’N (Jul. 20, 2015), https://www.organicconsumers.org/news/mex
ico%E2%80%99s-gmo-corn-ban-and-glyphosate-cancer-findings; Judge Overturns Mexico
GMO Maize Ban in Tragic Ruling, SUSTAINABLE PULSE (Aug. 20, 2015), http://sustain
ablepulse.com/2015/08/20/judge-overturns-mexico-gmo-maize-ban-in-tragicruling/#.VmWV9byC3ww.
174. Ademola A. Adenle, Are Transgenic Crops Safe? GM Agriculture in Africa, UNITED
NATIONS UNIVERSITY (Jan. 19, 2012), https://unu.edu/publications/articles/are-transgeniccrops-safe-gm-agriculture-in-africa.html. South Africa, though, is a major producer of
GMO products. See GLOB. LEGAL RESEARCH CTR., supra note 169, at 175.
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which is not easily overcome, even with cooperation. 175 On the other
hand, having such a divergence of preferences allows for
experimentation in regulation and no one model of handling risk to
dominate. Though it fosters regulatory fragmentation, making it more
difficult to achieve harmonization, it arguably allows for regulatory
structures to emerge locally and is better suited to address local and
regional problems.
B. Transnational Executive Authority and the Geopolitical Context of
Transnational Regulatory Standards
In either scenario, one thing remains clear: future trade
negotiations will give more weight to regulatory coherence than ever
before through the establishment of formal coordinating bodies. This
emphasis will increase opportunities for the U.S. executive power to
expand its scope in specific ways concerning social policy making, while
responding to specific calls to further trade liberalization and free
market liberalization. This trend will, in turn, impact the ways in which
the BRIC countries and lesser developed countries will develop their
own regulatory structures and standards. As Daniel Drezner has so
eloquently observed, while globalization has weakened the ability of
states to regulate domestically, the primary actors setting the rules for
regulatory coherence have been the great powers—namely, the United
States and the European Union.176 And yet, they have not always
agreed on the ways in which to regulate. Though global power has been
recalibrated with the emergence of the BRICs and China more
specifically as a strong economic force, when it comes to regulatory
standards, the United States and the European Union continue to lead
the world when it comes to setting regulatory standards. Therefore, to
the extent that the TTIP provides an opportunity for the two regions to
reach consensus of the areas that need regulation for the twenty-first
century and of the ways of ensuring heightened protection of the items
concerning natural resources, climate change, and public health, then
the TTIP, if completed, could have a positive impact globally. The
direction of global regulatory standards and the tolerance of regulation,
as set by the TTIP, will depend to a large extent on the stakeholders
participating in the discourse of those regulatory coordination boards.
Though non-state actors can certainly influence the outcomes and as
Drezner states, “jump-start regulatory agendas to advance their

175. DREZNER, supra note 72, at 162–64.
176. Id. at 149–75.
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issues,”177 the states, especially those with most global influence, are
still relevant. Therefore, ensuring that regulatory cooperation boards
have not only the participation of representatives of the product supply
chain networks and the private sector178 but also that of civil society and
citizens is important. Interestingly, the CETA encourages the
participation of civil society in dialoguing with the states on sustainable
development standards.179 Sustainability impact assessments that
include qualitative as well as quantitative data, as is encouraged in
CETA and in the current TTIP draft, will play a larger role as well,
especially for risk assessment processes. 180 Since the TTIP negotiations
have been put on hold and the United States has withdrawn from the
TPP, the European model for regulatory cooperation, demonstrated
through its current trade negotiations with various countries, will likely
dominate for now.
Despite Europe’s continued influence, the rise of the Chinese
economy and its need for natural resources cannot be ignored. China is
also a key player on the world political scene. Besides the strategic role
it plays in Asian geopolitics and its status as a nuclear nation, it is a
member of the U.N. Security Council, the World Trade Organization,
the Group of seventy-seven Developing Nations, the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation Group, and the Inter-American Development
Bank. It has been a major player in Africa, contributing to the
development of many infrastructure projects in exchange for access to
natural resources.181 Similarly, it has an increasing role in Latin
America. China has observer status in the Organization of American
States (OAS) and keeps a peacekeeping mission in Haiti. In 2009, China
Development Bank announced it would lend $10 billion to Petrobras,
the state-owned Brazilian oil company, in exchange for a guaranteed

177. Id. at 9.
178. See Bernard Hoekman, Fostering Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and
Gradual Multilateralization, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 609, 613, 617 (2015) (stating that
“[b]ringing together stakeholders from the countries involved in supply chains with the
aim of focusing attention on how various policy areas—tariffs, border management
procedures and requirements, product standards, regulatory agencies, access to transport
and distribution (logistics) services and so forth—jointly affect international production,
trade and investment could help achieve [mechanisms for sharing information on current
and needed regulatory policies].”).
179. See CETA, supra note 124, art. 22.5.
180. See generally Sheila Jasanoff, Bridging the Two Cultures of Risk Analysis, 13 RISK
ANALYSIS 123 (1993) (recommending the need for qualitative analysis of risk to better
account for cultural and political factors that affect the way people and regulatory experts
assess risk).
181. See DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN
AFRICA 146 (2009).
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supply of oil over the next decade.182 In 2005, China’s oil and gas giant
Sinopec Corp. signed an agreement with Cuba’s state-run Cubapetroleo
(Cupet) to jointly produce oil on the Caribbean island. China’s stateowned Minmetals is investing $500 million in a joint venture to produce
68,000 tonnes a year of ferro-nickel in eastern Cuba.183
Similarly, many of the WTO cases today concern more regular areas
of natural resource extraction and domestic clean energy strategies like
FIT schemes and biofuel policies. 184 As trade expands so does economic
growth, which in turn, leads to increased energy demand. For many
countries, developed and developing, natural resource extraction has
been at the center of economic growth policies. Shale gas production in
the United States is projected to account for two-thirds of U.S. natural
gas production by 2040. 185 The United States and Canada are the
world’s top producers of shale gas production, having accounted for 39
percent of U.S. natural gas production in 2012 and 15 percent of
Canada’s according to a 2013 report from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration.186 However, there is little federal regulation in the
United States of shale gas, so this is one area where federal agency
power, at least for the initial exploratory and extractive components of
shale gas production, is perhaps less relevant. 187 Most of the current
182. China to Lend Petrobras $10 Bln for Oil–Report, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2009, 9:58 AM)
https://www.reuters.com/article/petrobras-china-financing-idAFN1842749720090218.
183. See REUTERS, Timeline-Chinese Investments in Latin America (Mar. 15, 2010, 11:29
AM), https://in.reuters.com/article/cnooc-latinamerica-ma/timeline-chinese-investmentsin-latin-america-idINLDE62E1QQ20100315; see also CUBA BUSINESS NEWS, Cuba Oil
Cubapetroleo Signs Deal with China Oil Sinopec (Feb. 1, 2001), http://havanajournal.com/
business/entry/cuba_oil_cubapetroleo_signs_deal_with_china_oil_sinopec/
184. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells
and Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/AB/R, (adopted Sept. 16, 2016); Request for
Consultations by Japan, Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy
Generation Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/1 (Sept. 16, 2010); Request for Consultations by
European Union, Canada - Certain Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program,
WTO Doc. WT/DS426/1 (Aug. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Canada – Feed-in Tariff program].
The latter two were subsequently consolidated and modified by Appellate Body Report,
Canada - Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WTO Doc.
WT/DS412/AB/R (adopted May 6, 2013) and Appellate Body Report, Canada - Measures
Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, WT/DS426/AB/R (adopted May 6, 2013).
185. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017 (2017) (discussing
projections of domestic energy markets through the year 2050), https://www.eia.gov/
outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2017).pdf.
186. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NORTH AMERICA LEADS THE WORLD IN PRODUCTION
OF SHALE GAS (OCT. 23, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=13491; see
also Matt Egan, Oil Milestone: Fracking Fuels Half of U.S. Output, CNN MONEY NEWS,
(Mar. 24, 2016, 12:40 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/24/investing/fracking-shale-oilboom/index.html
187. Neither fracking nor water used for fracking is regulated under the U.S. Safe
Water Drinking Act due to the Halliburton exception. See Safe Water Drinking Act, 42
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regulation is at the state level, and it is being done piece-meal and
issue-based, with much heterogeneity among the states. 188 For example,
in the last five years, U.S. states have taken differing approaches to
developing disclosure requirements regarding the chemicals being used
for hydraulic fracturing, which requires a large amount of fresh
water.189 Some states, like New York, have taken a precautionary
approach, placing a temporary moratorium on the hydraulic fracturing
until further environmental impact assessments are done and state
disclosure requirements are completed.190 Some states, like Colorado,
Michigan, and Pennsylvania regulate with relative stringency in specific
aspects of fracturing, and others like Virginia and California, with
minimal stringency.191
Europe, on the other hand, has mostly taken a precautionary
approach when it comes to hydraulic fracturing. It has been up to each
Member State to decide its position on the issue. For the most part,
most EU countries have placed moratoria on hydraulic fracturing until
more studies and environmental impact assessments are done.192 In
2011, a report commissioned by the European Parliament noted the
various health and environmental risks associated with hydraulic

U.S.C. § 300f to 300j-27 (2016); Keith B. Hall, Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing Under
the Safe Water Drinking Act, 19 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 41 (2011).
188. See NATHAN RICHARDSON ET AL., THE STATE OF STATE SHALE GAS REGULATION, RFF
REPORT 2122 (2013), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/ RFF-RptStateofStateRegs_Report.pdf
189. The U.S. Safe Water Drinking Act does not regulate the use of water for hydraulic
fracturing due to the so-called Halliburton exception. See Mary Tiemann & Adam Vann,
Hydrolic Fracturing and Safe Drinking Water Act Regulatory Issues, CONG. RES. SERV. 20
(Jan. 10, 2013); William J. Brady & James P. Crannell, Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation
in the United States: The Laissez-Faire Approach of the Federal Government and Varying
State Regulations, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 39 (2012); see also Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic
Fracturing: Trade Secrets and the Mandatory Disclosure of Fracturing Water Composition,
49 IDAHO L. REV. 399 (2013) (discussing the differences in state mandatory disclosure
requirements regarding fracturing, especially as it relates to the protection of industry
trade secrets).
190. See NATHAN RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 188, at 73 (2013). Vermont was one of
the first states to place a complete moratorium on hydraulic fracturing.
191. See id. at 821 (also noting on page twelve that it should not be assumed that
states that regulate more aspects of fracturing necessarily regulate the development of the
industry more tightly or more effectively).
192. Neither England nor Poland have adopted this approach. The EU Commission filed
a case with the European Court of Justice, alleging that Poland failed to comply with EU
regulations regarding the exploration of hydrocarbons. See Case C-569/10: European
Commission v. Republic of Poland, INFOCURIA (Nov. 20, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=130121&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=891755.
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fracturing.193 France, Germany, and Bulgaria have all taken firm
stances against hydraulic fracturing and EU researchers and leaders
have chosen to halt projects until further data becomes available
regarding environmental and water contamination. 194 Many European
countries have gone so far as enacting bans and moratoriums on
fracking.195 In January of 2012, Bulgaria indicated that it is preparing
for a “full ban on shale gas drilling due to environmental concerns that
hydraulic fracturing may contaminate water.” 196 Within the European
Union, stringent regulations are imposed on private entities in order to
eliminate harmful effects on the environment. Another difference
between the U.S. and EU approaches to hydraulic fracturing is in the
character of property rights attributed to natural resources. Private
property rights in the majority of European countries only extend to the
surface.197 Below the surface the soil and minerals are publicly
owned.198 In contrast, in the United States, soil and minerals below the
surface are private property allowing for the private sale of minerals for
extraction. Individual property owners may sell the rights, making a
profit from royalty rights, to energy companies to extract underground
minerals on their property. In this way, individuals are incentivized to
enter into private contracts with these companies in ways that are not
present in Europe.
So far, the United States leads the world in this industry, but there
are a substantial number of shale reserves all over the world, especially
in Latin America. Recently, Columbia approved hydraulic fracturing in
specific areas of the northern part of the country, as did Argentina.199
193. AEA Technology, Support to the Identification of Potential Risks for the
Environment and Human Health Arising from Hydrocarbons Operations Involving
Hydraulic
Fracturing
in
Europe,
Doc.
No.
AEA/R/ED57281
(2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integra tion/energy/pdf/fracking%20study.pdf.
194. See Ryan S. Pigg, Poland’s Request for Shale Gas and Energy Independence: An
Examination of Domestic and International Hurdles, 35 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 735, 738 (2013).
195. See SIMON MOORE, GAS WORKS? SHALE GAS AND ITS POLICY IMPLICATIONS 52
(Simon Less ed., 2012).
196. Tsvetelia Tsolova, Bulgaria Cancels Chevron Shale Gas Permit, REUTERS (Jan. 17,
2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/17us-bulgaria-shalegas-chevronidUSTRE80G18J20120117.
197. See generally Justin P. Atkins, Hydraulic Fracturing in Poland: A Regulatory
Analysis, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 339 (2013) (discussing the regulations of
hydraulic fracturing in Poland and surrounding areas).
198. Id.
199. See El fracking llegó a Colombia, SEMANA SOSTENIBLE (Aug. 8, 2014), http://soste
nibilidad.semana.com/medio-ambiente/articulo/fracking-llego-colombia/31672; Francisco
Peregil, YPF y Chevron firman un acuerdo para explotar el yacimiento de Vaca Muerta, EL
PAÍS (July 17, 2013, 1:37 PM), http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2013/07/17/actualidad
/1374017376_300532.html. Natural resources in Argentina are managed by the provinces
and not the federal government.
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Mexico too is working on legislation to open up its energy industry,
traditionally constitutionally protected, to private investment. It
already has in place legislation for shale gas production in the Gulf of
Mexico.200 As this industry expands and grows, so will the
environmental impact.201 The ways in which the United States
regulates (or not) this industry will have effects on the manner in which
other regulatory bodies decide to regulate the industry. Despite the
United States retreating from the global stage in other areas, it remains
an important energy market player.202 It continues to increase its export
market of liquefied gas to Japan. 203 However, forty percent of the global
liquefied gas trade goes through the South China Sea. 204 Yet, much like
in the GMO context, the United States and the European Union have
very different approaches to how to manage the risk associated with
energy development, which can further divide the developing world as,
it too, cultivates its natural resources as part of their development
strategies. Including regulatory cooperation regarding energy
production and energy trade in trade agreements is yet another way in
which the executive branch can influence the harmonization of
regulations in this context.
Energy production has also been closely tied to the political rhetoric
around job creation in a time when the global economy is undergoing
challenges it has not seen since the Great Depression in 1929. Clean
energy strategies are framed as achieving two primarily goals: (1) to
provide much needed alternative energy sources as production increases
and the developing world develops at faster rates than in the past, and
(2) to mitigate climate change consequences by shifting the emphasis
toward “clean” strategies of production and supply. This emphasis on
energy and natural resource extraction as part of economic development
is front and center for international trade and investment today, and it
200. See Boris Otto et al., Issuance of the Mexican Secondary Laws in Connection with
the Constitutional Energy Reform, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.hklaw.
com/Publications/Issuance-of-the-Mexican-Secondary-Laws-in-Connection-with-theConstitutional-Energy-Reform-08-13-2014/; see also Mexico Energy Reform: Secondary
Legislation Enacted, MORGAN LEWIS (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.morganlewis.com/pu
bs/energy_lf_mexicoenergyreform-secondarylegislationenacted_12aug14.
201. Note increased seismic activity as a result of fracking as well as drinking water
contamination.
202. See, e.g., Robert McManmon & Michael Ford, Energy Trade is a Key Part of Overall
U.S. Trade Flows, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.eia.gov/today
inenergy/detail.php?id=15131.
203. See Liquified U.S. Natural Gas Exports to Japan, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9133ja2m.htm (last updated Nov. 30, 2017).
204. See Justine Barden et al., Almost 40% of Global Liquefied Natural Gas Trade
Moves Through the South China Sea, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=33592.
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reshapes the relationship between the developing and developed world.
Provisions concerning clean energy are found in the TPP, drafts of the
TTIP, and in the CETA, but they are not the primary focus of these
agreements. And yet, natural resource extraction and renewable energy
strategies are very much at the forefront of domestic policies for
economic development and job creation.
For developing countries like Latin America, natural resource
extraction is a janus-faced phenomenon, in that it is connected to
economic development but also resurrects a colonial past in which
industrialized countries used their natural resources for their own
economic development.205 For this reason, many Latin American
countries, for example, maintain that natural resources are
constitutionally protected and have legal doctrines like the Calvo
Doctrine.206 In negotiating new trade agreements, it is important to
reframe the trade and environment relationship in a manner that better
incorporates this new landscape of economic development through
natural resource extraction as well as climate change concerns. It will
create new implications for the relationships between the developed and
developing world as it relates to free trade and the environment,
accounting for the current geopolitical climate, which includes the
relevance of the BRICs in this respect. But it will also impact
transnational regulatory processes, especially as environmental
regulation increasingly moves toward market-driven mechanisms of
governance. Transnational regulatory cooperation is important in the
management of natural resources and climate change strategies as well
as in the development of greener forms of energy. However, the
oversight and management of these areas will remain intensely
domestic and under the purview of agencies. A multi-dimensional
framework for the trade and sustainable development relationship that
incorporates this complexity is necessary.

CONCLUSION: TRADE AND REGULATORY CONVERGENCE: IS THE FOX IN THE
HENHOUSE?
While formalizing transnational regulatory coherence in trade
agreements provides opportunities to streamline regulations, coordinate
205. See Mark Carey, Latin American Environmental History: Current Trends,
Interdisciplinary Insights, and Future Directions, 14 ENVTL. HIST. 221 (2009); Ewout
Frankema, The Colonial Roots of Land Inequality: Geography, Factor Endowments, or
Institutions?, 63 ECON. HIST. REV. 418 (2010).
206. See Patrick Juillard, Calvo Doctrine/Calvo Clause, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1086 (2012).
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licensing standards, and reach shared goals that benefit both business
and the public sector, it also raises concerns regarding the stakeholders
at play and whether the public interest is best served. It arguably
allows for more public participation by various stakeholders, public and
private, in the negotiation of these trade agreements, but it also has the
potential of diminishing the role of public comment on new regulations
and runs the risk that some regulations that benefit trade may be at
cross purposes with the public interest, unless the agreement
specifically allows some rebalancing in cases of environmental goods, for
example, and climate change mitigation (as in CETA). From a
governance perspective, though, regulatory cooperation bodies and
specialized committees within these trade agreements can be an
important step toward global governance, with the “transfer[ring] [of]
authority from the national to the supranational.”207 This will require
increased technical expertise and allow for more efficient regulatory
decision-making, and potentially more inter-agency coordination at the
domestic level that takes into account the need to reduce the potential
for trade protectionism.
However, without some recognition that regulation essentially
protects the public good and therefore directly implicates the citizen,
these treaties with formalized regulatory cooperation bodies and
specialized committees also provide a means to circumvent the
democratic process.208 Furthermore, as knowledge and political decisionmaking become more technocratic domestically and opportunities for
more transnational decision-making are in place, the executive
authority who is responsible for negotiating these agreements also
becomes embedded in a regulatory bargaining process, shifting the
traditional role of the executive branch in the trade agreement process.
In addition, with U.S. fast-track authority, legislative involvement is
arguably reduced, contributing to an increased democratic deficit and
essentially leaving it up to regulators, interest groups, and other
stakeholders most interested in the regulatory outcomes as having the
greatest influence on the final trade agreement. Despite these
challenges, though, regulatory coordination is more likely to occur
regionally than globally because of the difficulty of reaching political
207. DREZNER, supra note 72, at 9.
208. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade
Agreements Without Rights and Remedies of Citizens?, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 579, 579 (2015)
(insisting that international treaties with “’legislative functions’ for protecting
transnational public goods must be governed democratically and protect transnational
rights and remedies of citizens so as to enable the ‘democratic principals’ to hold
governance agents and their limited ‘constituted powers’ more accountable for the
ubiquity of ‘market failures’ and ‘governance failures’ that continue to distort
transatlantic relations, rule of law, and consumer welfare.”).
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consensus on a global scale. Negotiating preferential trade agreements
that increase the role of transnational regulatory boards allows for
important dialogues to take place, and for trade interests and regulatory
ones to find common ground. At the same time, it allows executive
authority and the concentration of expertise in technocrats to pave the
direction of the areas that are regulated and the method of regulation.
Expansion of the transnational executive has important
implications for domestic regulation, especially in the United States’
current climate of feeble regulatory enforcement. If instead of the TPP,
the United States decides to enter into bilateral trade agreements,
especially with Asian countries, regulatory coherence and reduction will
likely continue to be front and center of those negotiations. Using
international trade agreements to formalize regulatory standards, or
lessen the use of these standards, requires full participation of all
interests for these standards to be effective in protecting the public
interest. Participation should include representatives from civil society
and developing countries, where natural resources are robust. The
formalizing of regulatory standards in these ways, especially if the U.S.
and the EU lead the charge, will have external impacts on how
regulatory standards develop in other countries as well. A transfer of
regulatory authority to the executive branch, especially coupled with
executive power to negotiate trade agreements, not only increases the
role of the specialized expertise, but it also can potentially create
perverse effects on democracy itself.

